Saint Louis University Law Journal
Volume 63
Number 3 Law School Teaching Methods
(Spring 2019)

Article 4

2019

Law School in a Different Voice: Legal Education as a Work of
Mercy
Pamela A. Wilkins
University of Detroit Mercy School of Law, wilkinpa@udmercy.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Pamela A. Wilkins, Law School in a Different Voice: Legal Education as a Work of Mercy, 63 St. Louis U.
L.J. (2019).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj/vol63/iss3/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Saint Louis University Law Journal by an authorized editor of Scholarship Commons. For more
information, please contact Susie Lee.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

LAW SCHOOL IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: LEGAL EDUCATION AS A
WORK OF MERCY

PAMELA A. WILKINS*
[W]e live in complex and deeply challenging times. Our society most often
measures the value of a person by his or her productivity alone and discards the
unproductive along the way.
We live in a society so mesmerized by its view of success that it considers real
only that which can be touched, weighed, and measured, a culture in which
human and spiritual values have almost vanished from its consciousness.
Whether it is our brothers and sisters living on the streets in this city of such
great power [Washington D.C.], or the tens of millions of persons around the
globe who have become refugees because of both political and economic
violence; today there is such devastating human suffering and dehumanization.
The world’s most notable Jesuit has spoken powerfully about this very reality.
Addressing the Fortune-Time Global Forum last December, Pope Francis
affirmed the “urgent need for more inclusive and equitable economic models.”
He has called for a “revolution of tenderness.”
Today, more than ever, we need this “revolution of tenderness.” This may be a
strange message given the prestige of Georgetown University. However, I ask
you to consider that our hearts are becoming hard.
Mary Scullion, May 20, 2017, Georgetown College (of
Georgetown University) Commencement Address 1

I. INTRODUCTION
Sister Mary Scullion is a badass. Moved by a desire to alleviate suffering,
she joined the Sisters of Mercy at age nineteen. One thing led to another, and
pretty soon she found herself sleeping on the streets in solidarity with the

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Detroit Mercy School of Law. I would like to thank
Sister Helen Marie Burns, RSM; Professor Linda Edwards, E.L. Cord Foundation Professor of Law
(UNLV); and my Detroit Mercy colleagues Professor Andrew Moore and Professor Cara
Cunningham Warren for reading and commenting upon earlier versions of this article.
1. The text of the Commencement Address may be found at Homeward: The Official Blog
of Project Home, https://projecthome.org/posts/2017/05/sister-mary-georgetown-grads-begin-revo
lution-tenderness [https://perma.cc/W4EL-U83X] (May 18, 2017).
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homeless. 2 This little act of solidarity—one week of wholly (holy!) voluntary
homelessness—was “the hardest thing [Mary] ever did. [She returned] sick as a
dog, really depleted.” 3 Hard as it was, her little act of solidarity gave her great
empathy for people on the streets.
This empathy led to direct action and political advocacy. Her efforts have
provided employment, education, healthcare, and housing (for more than 2,200
people) to the chronically homeless, including homeless mentally ill women, in
Philadelphia. 4 She’s been recognized nationally and internationally. 5 She’s even
been arrested. 6
Dr. Margaret Farley is another badass. Of course she’s an intellectual badass
with a formidable CV: Gilbert L. Stark Professor Emerita of Christian Ethics at
Yale Divinity School; former president of both the Catholic Theological Society
of America and the Society of Christian Ethics; prize-winning author of books
and articles in the areas of medical and bioethics, feminist ethics, sexual ethics,
and theological ethics; recipient of eleven honorary degrees. 7 But her acclaim—
at times notoriety 8—isn’t really the point. What’s remarkable is the flavor of her

2. See Meet Sister Mary Scullion (Modern Hero Prods. 2017), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=Z1NndaZFyH0 [https://perma.cc/CU77-VPEL] (last accessed Aug. 18, 2018). Sisters of
Mercy make annual retreats, and early in her days as a sister, Mary Scullion asked for her retreat
to consist of a week on the streets.
3. See The Philadelphia Award, Sister Mary Scullion, RSM, http://philadelphiaaward.org/
sister-mary-scullion/ [https://perma.cc/3J4C-DLCZ] (last accessed Aug. 18, 2018) [hereinafter
Sister Mary Scullion, RSM].
4. Project Home, Leadership at Project Home, https://projecthome.org/about/leadershipproject-home [https://perma.cc/7LAE-DMFA] (last accessed Aug. 18, 2018).
5. Id.
6. See Sister Mary Scullion, RSM, supra note 3.
7. Yale Divinity School, Margaret A. Farley, https://divinity.yale.edu/faculty-and-research/
yds-faculty/margaret-farley [https://perma.cc/RNB4-ZHRT] (last accessed Aug. 18, 2018).
8. Dr. Farley received the 2008 Grawemeyer Award in Religion for Just Love, her
exploration of Christian sexual ethics. See http://grawemeyer.org/2008-margaret-farley/
[https://perma.cc/G9TN-2PHG] (last accessed Aug. 18, 2018). However, the book also received a
Notification from the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, noting that it “affirms teachings
that are in direct contradiction with Catholic teaching in the field of sexual morality.” See, e.g.,
BBC News, Vatican Critical of U.S. Nun’s Book on Sexual Ethics, https://www.bbc.com/news/
world-europe-18321830 [https://perma.cc/6Q5S-QNE7] (June 4, 2012) (describing Vatican’s
criticism). Although she conceded that her work did not conform to current Catholic teaching on
sexuality, Dr. Farley observed that the dispute actually reflected a dispute over the task of the
theologian:
The issue is, finally, in our tradition, is it a contradiction to have power settle questions of
truth? Or to say we all have a capacity to know what we ought to do? We can make mistakes,
we can disagree—but is it the case that natural law is let go when we really only know the
answers because of grace of office? This is a profoundly important question in our tradition
today.
Joshua J. McElwee, Vatican-criticized Nun Addresses Fellow Theologians, Natl. Catholic Rptr.
(June 10, 2012) (available at https://www.ncronline.org/news/spirituality/vatican-criticized-nun-
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work, which is characterized by a determination to include the experiences of
women and of other once invisible persons in exploring age-old issues; 9 by an
openness to insights from a wide variety of disciplines and cultures; 10 and by a
concern for justice not simply in the abstract, but in the concrete reality of actual
relationships. 11 And the work is motivated by compassion: when asked why she
tackled controversial issues in Just Love, she said simply, “My reasons for
thinking it’s important for everyone to think about these issues is because people
are suffering. All over the place, people are suffering.” 12
The two women are profoundly different—Mary Scullion is a quintessential
activist, Margaret Farley a quintessential scholar—but they share the same
spiritual DNA. They are both members of the Sisters of Mercy. And from this
common charism arises a common commitment to a tough-minded and tenderhearted mercy, with a special concern for women and girls.
What might it mean for a law school to share this Mercy charism? More
broadly, what would it mean for a law school to share the spiritual DNA of a
female order, seeing the world from historically female perspectives and
motivated by historically female concerns? More broadly still, in this #metoo 13
era, in which women make up the majority of American law students, 14 should
it simply be business as usual at religiously affiliated law schools, or should we
seize the opportunity to consider seriously, and in the light of faith, women’s
perspectives on legal education, law, and justice?
This article is my attempt to grapple with these questions. My interest is, of
course, personal. I am on the faculty at University of Detroit Mercy School of
addresses-fellow-theologians?_ga=2.181445092.2145393972.1519430676-469135285.1519430
676 [https://perma.cc/FL3P-P9ES]) (including excerpts from a speech by Dr. Farley to the Catholic
Theological Society of America).
9. See, e.g., Margaret A. Farley, Just Love 17 (Continuum Intl. Publg. Group 2006)
(“[E]thical theory regarding sex . . . has been predominantly theory formulated by an elite group of
men in any given society. Women’s experiences, beliefs, values, are unrecorded and, until recently,
almost wholly inaccessible. The same is true for men who do not belong to a dominant class.”).
10. See generally id. at Pts 3 & 4.
11. See, e.g., id. at 200 et seq. (“A love is right and good insofar as it aims to affirm truthfully
the concrete reality of the beloved.”).
12. See McElwee, supra note 8 (quoting Dr. Farley’s speech to the Catholic Theological
Society of America).
13. The me too movement was founded in 2006 by Tarana Burke, and its original purpose was
to “help survivors of sexual violence, particularly Black women and girls, and other young women
of color from low wealth communities, find pathways to healing.” https://metoomvmt.org/about
/#history [https://perma.cc/UDW3-RZUF] (last accessed Apr. 14, 2019). In recent years, through
the viral hashtag #metoo, “[w]hat started as local grassroots work has expanded to reach a global
community of survivors from all walks of life and helped to de-stigmatize the act of surviving by
highlighting the breadth and impact of sexual violence worldwide.” Id.
14. See Elizabeth Olson, Women Make Up Majority of U.S. Law Students for First Time, NY
Times (Dec. 16, 2016) (available at https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/16/business/dealbook/
women-majority-of-us-law-students-first-time.html [https://perma.cc/8YQ5-DUFL]).
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Law. Our institution enjoys both a Jesuit and a Mercy identity. 15 The Jesuit
brand of legal education is well known and has its own distinctive flavor—of
that, more later. 16 But this school is the only Mercy law school in the United
States and one of only two religiously affiliated law schools 17 sponsored by a
female order. What might legal education be like, especially at Detroit Mercy,
if we took our Mercy identity seriously? As a faculty member, a feminist, and a
Christian, I believe our Mercy identity presents an opportunity to reimagine and
reinvigorate legal education and law in ways that extend well beyond the walls
of my own institution.
This article begins to imagine such an education. The preliminary sections
examine the major sources that inform my vision for law school “in a different
voice,” 18 that is, for legal education in the Mercy tradition. Parts II through IV
explore the life and values of Catherine McAuley, founder of the Sisters of
Mercy; the current values, priorities, and educational mission of the Mercy
Institute within the United States; and scholarship on Mercy identity in higher
education. Part V turns to religiously affiliated law schools, with a special focus
on Jesuit identity in legal education. Each of these sources constitutes a building
block for Part VI.
Part VI articulates my vision for legal education in the Mercy tradition. Such
an education is defined by two special commitments: first, to mercifulness;
second, to women and girls. Part VI explores what the two commitments mean
within the context of legal education.
Briefly put, the commitment to mercifulness requires that the education we
provide helps students first to see and “interiorize[], absorb[] in the innards,”19
the suffering of others, that is, to see the crucified peoples of our society and
world. This education also should help students to react with well-informed
mercy, “to do everything . . . possible to bring [the suffering] down from the

15. See http://law.udmercy.edu/about-us/history.php [https://perma.cc/SF8Q-NY66] (last
accessed Aug. 18, 2018). The School of Law originally was part of the University of Detroit, a
Jesuit university. In 1990, the University of Detroit merged with Mercy College, and since then,
the Society of Jesus (Jesuits) and Sisters of Mercy have served as joint sponsors for the institution.
See http://www.udmercy.edu/about/history.php [https://perma.cc/CNG3-7QZ6] (last accessed
Aug. 18, 2018).
16. See infra Parts IV & V (discussing Jesuit universities and Jesuit legal education).
17. Barry University, which includes a law school, was founded by the Adrian Dominican
sisters. See https://www.barry.edu/law/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/79ZS-6UTQ] (last accessed
April 3, 2018). Unlike the Mercy congregation, which was founded by women, the Dominican
order began as a male order and later expanded to women religious.
18. This term is borrowed from the title of Carol Gilligan’s groundbreaking book. See CAROL
GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN’S DEVELOPMENT
(1982).
19. JON SOBRINO, THE PRINCIPLE OF MERCY: TAKING THE CRUCIFIED PEOPLE FROM THE
CROSS 17 (Orbis Books 1994).
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cross.” 20 Work to bring crucified peoples down from the cross is justice work,
but this urge to remedy injustice is motivated by mercy. How students work to
alleviate suffering may vary—note the differences between Mary Scullion and
Margaret Farley—but if human suffering is invisible to them or if they are
indifferent to it, we have failed. Part VI describes, inter alia, how the law school
curriculum might more effectively form lawyers who will be governed by a
principle of mercy.
The commitment to women and girls is related to the commitment to
mercifulness. It begins with the recognition that women and girls sometimes
have been among the crucified peoples, and that our legal system has all too
often aided and abetted the crucifiers. (To a degree, this is true even within the
legal academy.) Thus, this commitment to women and girls requires that we help
students understand and question many of the assumptions underlying American
law, and examine whether such assumptions have harmed women and girls, not
to mention any number of other vulnerable groups. I am thinking in particular
of the radically individualistic conception of the human person that undergirds
all too much of American law and of our perceptions of justice—a conception
of the human person inconsistent with both feminist and Christian thought. 21
The commitment also requires work on behalf of women and girls. Finally, it
also suggests working to replace the highly individualistic values prevalent
within the law school culture itself with an ethos that prioritizes community.
A law school defined by core, spirit-meets-the-bone commitments to
mercifulness and to women and girls would be a prophetic presence even among
religiously affiliated law schools. Indeed, a deep commitment to a principle of
mercy—to seeing and identifying the crucified, to taking them down from the
cross—unmasks and confronts the idolatries that afflict legal education,
especially the golden calf of status obsession. An institution embodying these
commitments would be badass in the best sense: as fierce and tender as Mary
Scullion; as intellectually disciplined and open to a variety of perspectives as
Margaret Farley; as committed to women, the vulnerable, and justice as right
relationship as both Scullion and Farley.
Let us begin.
II. CATHERINE MCAULEY AND THE HOUSE OF MERCY
The first source for this vision of legal education is the life of the woman
who founded the Sisters of Mercy.
The Mercy congregation could only have been born of a woman. A wealthy
woman’s troubled midlife dreams of orphan children and destitute females gave
birth first to the House of Mercy, a home dedicated to caring for and empowering
poor women and children through education and job training; then to the Mercy
20. Id. at 10.
21. See infra Part VI.B.
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congregation itself, which carried this mission of care and empowerment
throughout the world.
Catherine McAuley was that wealthy dreamer who went on to found the
Sisters of Mercy. 22 Yet even as her wealth enabled her to realize her vision of a
House of Mercy, her own inner sense of poverty was the source of the vision.
Her concern for orphan children and destitute females was rooted not in a sense
of noblesse oblige, nor in an abstract concern for justice, nor in a conventional
piety, nor merely in compassion. Rather, Catherine identified with the orphans
and the poor women. For like them—like virtually all women of 19th Century
Dublin, and probably most other places and times—Catherine knew what it
meant to be vulnerable, dependent, invisible. Her life story illumines both the
reasons for Catherine’s identification and solidarity with orphan children and
destitute females and her creative, graceful response to female vulnerability
within a patriarchal society.
Catherine’s own experiences of loss, orphanhood, and vulnerability began
early. Born in Dublin in 1778 to a Catholic family, Catherine lost her father
when she was only four years old. 23 Her mother died in 1798, just as Catherine’s
teenage years were ending. 24 The death of her father during her young childhood
appears to have affected Catherine profoundly. First, and rather obviously—this
early loss was both an emotional and material blow. Certainly her father’s death
caused her strong identification with both orphans and vulnerable women.
Second, and less obviously, the loss apparently intensified Catherine’s
identification with her father. Her principal biographer credits Catherine’s early
memories of her father providing religious instruction to poor children as a major
influence on her later vocation. 25 Her deep Catholic faith also appears to stem
from her identification with her father.
After her mother’s death, Catherine eventually went to live with a wealthy
Quaker couple, William and Catherine Callaghan. 26 She served both as
household manager and as surrogate daughter to the childless couple. 27
Although she enjoyed the social life typical of affluent Dubliners, 28 she
displayed a noticeable depth of character. She was a “young woman of

22. For an excellent biography of Catherine McAuley, see MARY C. SULLIVAN, THE PATH OF
MERCY: THE LIFE OF CATHERINE MCAULEY (Catholic Univ. Press 2012). The Path of Mercy
serves as the major source for my brief overview of Catherine’s life and work.
23. Mercy Intl. Assn., Foundress: The Beginning, http://www.mercyworld.org/foundress/
index.cfm?loadref=51 [https://perma.cc/VQ5W-HZRG] (last accessed Aug. 18, 2018) [hereinafter
The Beginning].
24. Id.
25. SULLIVAN, supra note 22, at 19, 38.
26. Id. at 30.
27. The Beginning, supra note 23.
28. SULLIVAN, supra note 22, at 37 (describing Catherine’s love for music and dancing); 38
(describing Catherine’s living “in good style”).
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remarkable charm and good looks . . . [but] was also a conscientious thinker,
appreciative of the surfaces of daily existence, but not satisfied that they were
all there was to human life.” 29
Just as she identified with orphan children and destitute females, Catherine
also identified with those who protected and cared for them. This identification
began with her own parents (recall her memories of her father’s religious
instruction to poor children) but it deepened during this period of her life. Mrs.
Callaghan played the strongest role. Mrs. Callaghan’s Quaker spirituality
included an appreciation of silence and an emphasis on charity to the poor, both
of which were characteristic of Quakers in Ireland and elsewhere. 30 Mrs.
Callaghan herself was involved with such charity, but as she aged, Catherine
increasingly became her instrument of that charity. 31 Catherine provided
instruction and counsel to the poor children of the neighborhood, and Mrs.
Callaghan both approved of this and provided for it materially. 32 Of course, Mrs.
Callaghan’s influence led to the independent influence of coming into contact
and seeing the needs and privation of poor children and others afflicted by
poverty.
During her time with Mr. and Mrs. Callaghan, Catherine’s identity as a
caregiver grew, but, just as importantly, so did her actual caregiving skills. Mrs.
Callaghan was bedridden for three years during her final illness. 33 Catherine,
whose bedroom was adjacent, “learned what one learns to do for the sick by
doing it.” 34 She read to Mrs. Callaghan and often slept on a couch in the room
so that she could tend to her needs at all hours. 35
During this period of caregiving, when she was “faced with a new and timeconsuming form of mercifulness,” 36 Catherine began dreaming of orphan
children and destitute women. 37 These dreams focused on empowerment for
these vulnerable Dubliners: the destitute women of her dreams were “learning
employable household skills.” 38
Catherine’s dreams began to take concrete form after Mrs. Callaghan’s
death. Catherine’s caregiving responsibilities had not diminished: she was
caring for both the elderly and the very young. 39 Yet in the midst of these
exhausting responsibilities, she envisioned a future in which she would rent out

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 32.
Id. at 40.
Id.
Id.
SULLIVAN, supra note 22, at 40-41.
Id. at 41.
Id.
Id. at 40.
Id. at 41.
SULLIVAN, supra note 22, at 41.
She cared for both Mr. Callaghan and the children of a cousin who had died. Id. at 53.
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rooms and work with and for the poor: “Night after night she would see herself
in some very large place where a number of young women were employed as
laundresses or at plain-work, while she herself would be surrounded by a crowd
of ragged children which she was washing and dressing very busily.” 40
The dreams were realistic. Mr. Callaghan was a wealthy man, and when he
died, Catherine inherited a fortune. 41 Catherine used her fortune to build and
open the House of Mercy. 42 It served as a homeless shelter for women and girls,
a school for poor girls, and a job training center for women. 43 Poor women and
girls immediately flocked to it, and poverty-stricken parents soon found this free
school for their daughters. 44 Within a year, Catherine and the lay women living
at or assisting with the House of Mercy began visiting the sick in Dublin’s slums
and wherever else the women could gain admission. 45
Several features of the House of Mercy shed light on Catherine’s values.
First, it was located in the heart of a fashionable, affluent area, where the poor
would not be invisible to the rich. 46 Second, from the outset and prior to the
founding of a religious congregation, Catherine McAuley and the House of
Mercy were devoted to education, especially for poor women; to job training,
again for poor women; and to compassion for and service to the sick, especially
the poor. Catherine seems to have regarded education and job training, like
visiting the sick, as forms of caregiving. Differently put, all of the initial
ministries of the House of Mercy revolved around an ethic of care. Third, the
House of Mercy served as a model of female agency: a woman conceived it and
women ran it. 47 Finally, it was initially a lay house, perhaps much like Jane
Addams’ Hull House or Dorothy Day’s original Catholic Worker House: “[T]he
idea of founding a religious congregation never entered [Catherine’s] mind” at
the time she built the House of Mercy. 48
The founding of the Sisters of Mercy itself apparently was motivated in part
by practical concerns—a belief that the mission would best be continued through
40. Id. at 53.
41. In 2007 U.S. dollars (the date her biographer used), she inherited somewhere between
$1.78 and $3.65 million, some of which was to be paid as an annuity. Id.
42. Id. at 66.
43. SULLIVAN, supra note 22, at 67.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 71.
46. Id. at 55, 68. Some of the wealthy residents of the area objected to the House of Mercy,
preferring a neighborhood free of any inconvenient reminders of the grinding poverty of so many
Dubliners. However, others—both Catholics and Protestants—saw the poverty that surrounded
them and responded with generosity and compassion.
47. This, too, created grumbling in some circles. See id. at 68 (noting that some of the
complaints about Catherine were “flavored with sexist overtones”); See SULLIVAN, supra note 22,
at 88 (noting people’s objection to the resident lay women’s “mode of life”). Of course, many
priests, clerics, and other men supported Catherine’s vision.
48. Id. at 65.
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a religious congregation. 49 After its founding, the congregation expanded
throughout Ireland and into England, and Catherine spent many years traveling
across the countryside establishing convent houses dedicated to serving poor
women. 50 Unfortunately, Catherine herself was sick with tuberculosis, and,
worn out from her travels, died in late 1841. 51
In the House of Mercy and the subsequent communities, the influence of
Catherine’s parents and of Mr. and Mrs. Callaghan is apparent. But the person
of Jesus—both Catherine’s identification with and understanding of him—also
served as a model. Dr. Mary Sullivan describes the central strands of Catherine’s
faith and motivation. They include Catherine’s belief “in the thoroughness of
Jesus Christ’s compassionate, even ‘tender,’ identification with the ‘least’—
with those who were poor and suffering.” 52 The concept of self-bestowal, or
giving of self to and for the sake of others, also figures prominently, with Jesus
as the self-bestowal of God, his death on the cross as the “fullest human
expression” of God’s self-bestowal, and the gospels as an invitation to us to
participate in this self-bestowal. 53 Finally, Catherine believed that human
mercifulness is the “principal path . . . to those who are desirous of following
[Jesus].” 54
Part VI contains a more complete discussion of how Catherine’s life and
values should inform legal education in the Mercy tradition, but the following
themes merit identification now:
a) Vocation as a creative and skilled response to our vulnerabilities and
wounds: Catherine’s vocation appears to be rooted in the early loss of
her father, which led to her identification and solidarity with orphans and
poor women. During much of her early adulthood she acquired
caregiving skills that she later used to care for and thereby empower
orphans and poor women. Put more generally, for many of us, our
professional vocation not only serves others, but also can fulfill our own
need to heal our wounds. Differently put, our own suffering can open us
to the suffering of others in ways that are life-giving for all.

49. Foundress: Foundation, MERCY INTL. ASS’N., http://www.mercyworld.org/foundress/
index.cfm?loadref=52 [https://perma.cc/2SVW-FQJ2] (last accessed Aug. 18, 2018) [hereinafter
Foundation].
50. Foundress: Expansion, MERCY INTL. ASS’N., http://www.mercyworld.org/foundress/
index.cfm?loadref=54 [https://perma.cc/MZW8-WBR5] (last accessed Aug. 18, 2018) [hereinafter
Expansion].
51. Foundress: Final Months, MERCY INTL. ASS’N., http://www.mercyworld.org/foundress/
index.cfm?loadref=66 [https://perma.cc/7CEP-RNJH] (last accessed Aug. 18, 2018) [hereinafter
Final Months].
52. SULLIVAN, supra note 22, at 159.
53. Id.
54. Id.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

410

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 63:401

b) Vocation as a response to and development of preexisting identifications:
As described above, Catherine probably identified as a caregiver very
early in life. This identity grew stronger during her early adulthood, as
she learned from and cared for Mrs. Callaghan. Catherine’s principal
work in the world—her founding of the House of Mercy and then the
Mercy congregation—was simply a continuation and expansion of an
identity she had long ago claimed and developed. Differently put,
professional identity formation usually begins well before one
consciously selects a profession or life path.
c) The centrality of an ethic of care: Catherine described mercifulness as
the principal path for followers of Jesus. Her words and deeds reveal an
ethic of care, meaning in part a conviction that caregiving is “an ethical
activity, rather than . . . a strictly emotional—and hence morally
arbitrary—response.” 55
d) The dignity and agency of women: Catherine clearly enjoyed a strong
sense of self and of agency: she would not have founded a House of
Mercy and placed it smack in the middle of a wealthy area of town if she
lacked confidence in her own vision or ability to act. Moreover, the
House of Mercy was devoted largely to uplifting poor women so that
they and their children would enjoy some measure of dignity and
autonomy.
e) The Gospel call to self-bestowal: Catherine understood life as a spiritual
journey centered in and toward God. 56 And throughout this journey, we
are invited to follow and imitate Jesus through self-bestowal, or the
giving of ourselves in service to others. Indeed, self-bestowal is our core
and common calling.
Catherine McAuley’s life and work were only the beginning of the Mercy
congregation. As the next section will describe, the Sisters of Mercy spread to
the Americas and founded both hospitals and colleges. They also preserved
Catherine’s original charism while adapting it to new places and circumstances.

55. ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE 23 (NYU Press 1997). Carol Gilligan, whose
psychological research on children’s moral development led to the term “ethic of care,” identifies
the ethic of care as a “‘different voice’ . . . that join[s] self with relationship and reason with
emotion.” Interview with Carol Gilligan, University Prof., New York University (June 6, 2011)
(available at https://ethicsofcare.org/carol-gilligan/ [https://perma.cc/QF39-9AUF]). Gilligan
describes the ethic of care as grounded in voice and relationships, in the importance of everyone
having a voice, being listened to carefully (in their own right and on their own terms) and heard
with respect. An ethics of care directs our attention to the need for responsiveness in relationships
(paying attention, listening, responding) and to the costs of losing connection with oneself or others.
Its logic is inductive, contextual, psychological, rather than deductive or mathematical. Id.
56. SULLIVAN, supra note 22, at 159.
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III. THE SISTERS OF MERCY OF THE AMERICAS: DEVELOPMENT, CHARISM,
AND CRITICAL CONCERNS
The second major source for a vision of Mercy legal education is the modern
Mercy Institute, especially within the United States.
The core ministries of the Sisters of Mercy have remained the same despite
the passage of both time and oceans. 57 At the time of Catherine McAuley’s death
in 1841, the Sisters of Mercy had been established in England and Ireland. 58 In
1843, the congregation made its way to the United States, at the invitation of the
Bishop of Pittsburgh; 59 by 1854, it was present in major cities in every corner of
the United States. 60 As was true in England and Ireland—and as remains true to
this day—the Sisters of Mercy 61 performed works of mercy, focusing especially
on education and healthcare and establishing schools and hospitals throughout
the country. 62
The Sisters of Mercy of the Americas also continue to be inspired by
Catherine’s core values, especially her concern for vulnerable women and
children and her embrace of mercy as the principal path for following Jesus 63
However, the 21st century United States is profoundly different from 19th
century Ireland, and the Mercy Institute naturally has evolved in order to
embody its charism under new circumstances.
The Sisters of Mercy of the Americas have identified several core values,
all of which were inspired by Catherine’s life: spirituality, community, service,
and social justice. 64 The Institute also is committed to the spiritual and corporal
works of mercy 65 as a component of both service and social justice. The terms
“spirituality,” “community,” “service,” and “social justice” are defined
consistently with Catherine’s teachings and example. “Spirituality” is an active
spirituality 66 in which members lead lives of service in the world, with prayer
and contemplation reinforcing service and vice versa. For the Sisters of Mercy,
57. See infra note 63 and accompanying text.
58. Our History, SISTERS OF MERCY, https://www.sistersofmercy.org/about-us/our-history/
[https://perma.cc/6QHM-A32E] (last accessed Apr. 14, 2019).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Within North and South America, the proper name for the congregation is the Institute of
the Sisters of Mercy of the Americas. However, for the sake of brevity, I will simply refer to the
“Sisters of Mercy” or the “Mercy Institute” (or the “Institute”).
62. Id. See infra Part IV (will address the Mercy educational ministry in greater detail).
63. Cf. Mission and Values, SISTERS OF MERCY, https://www.sistersofmercy.org/about-us/
our-history/ [https://perma.cc/AA4P-AHHL] (describing continued influence of Catherine
McAuley and referring to core values, including social justice concerns) (last accessed Apr. 14,
2019).
64. Mission and Values, SISTERS OF MERCY, https://www.sistersofmercy.org/about-us/
mission-values/ [https://perma.cc/35G5-UE7G] (last accessed Aug. 19, 2018).
65. Id. (naming the works of mercy).
66. Id.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

412

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 63:401

living in “community” “deepens our relationship with God, strengthens us for
mission, and continually inspires us in our call to serve others.” 67 “Service”
focuses on the alleviation of suffering, especially among the most marginalized
within society. 68 Finally, service must include “social justice” work; that is, it
includes not only direct service to alleviate suffering but also the work to change
unjust systems that cause human suffering. 69
The nature of the commitment to social justice best illustrates the Institute’s
adaptation of its charism to the needs of our era. Recognizing “the immensity of
this work [i.e., social justice work],” 70 the Sisters of Mercy of the Americas have
identified a series of interrelated concerns, referred to as the “Critical
Concerns,” 71 which guide the work of individual Sisters and the Institute as a
whole during this era.
The five Critical Concerns are Earth, Immigration, Nonviolence, AntiRacism, and Women. 72 The timeliness and urgency of these concerns is obvious.
I would show how and why each concern is urgent (e.g., earth: death of the great
barrier reef and much of ocean wildlife because of climate change; immigration:
family separations; etc.), but the examples probably will proliferate
exponentially by the time this article is published. The importance of these
concerns is self-evident. In addition to the work of individual Sisters of Mercy,
the Institute itself takes actions (through investments, formal declarations, new
ministry initiatives) consistent with these concerns. 73
The Institute’s core values and Critical Concerns should play important roles
within a Mercy law school. However, before the article turns to those roles, Part
IV will examine the Mercy mission within higher education more generally.
IV. MERCY HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES: DEVELOPMENT,
DISTINCTIVE FEATURES, AND VALUES
The third major source of my vision for Mercy legal education is Mercy
higher education more generally, including both empirical information about
Mercy colleges and universities and scholarly reflection on Mercy identity in
higher education.
Education has been and continues to be a central ministry of the Sisters of
Mercy. Of course, education is a core ministry of many of the active orders
within the Roman Catholic Church, and Mercy education enjoys many
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Mission and Values, supra note 64.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See generally What We Do, SISTERS OF MERCY, https://www.sistersofmercy.org/about-us
/mission-values/ [https://perma.cc/8D32-V4G2] (pages describing various Institute ministries,
including a socially responsible investment ministry) (last accessed Apr. 14, 2019).
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commonalities with the other major “brands” within Catholic education. At the
same time, Mercy higher education has its own distinctive flavor. This
distinctiveness has two major sources: historical differences between the Sisters
of Mercy and other major educational orders, as well as more recent scholarly
efforts to define the Mercy educational mission. This section will first discuss
the development and present status of Mercy higher education within the United
States; here, a comparison of Mercy and Jesuit higher education will highlight
Mercy education’s distinctiveness. The section will next examine scholarly
analyses of Mercy identity in higher education.
A.

Mercy Higher Education in the United States: A Comparative
Examination

From the inception of the Sisters of Mercy, Mercy education has focused on
providing poor girls and women with the practical skills necessary for making a
living. 74 Accompanying this commitment to the poor is a more traditional
educational mission: in both Ireland and the United States, alongside Mercy
schools for poor children (especially girls) are what Catherine would have called
“pension” schools—those where middle-class girls and others paid tuition for
their education. 75 Operating alongside elementary and secondary schools are
seventeen Mercy-sponsored colleges and universities within the United States,
many of which initially were women’s schools but most of which are now
coeducational. 76
These colleges and universities share a history quite similar to that of other
Catholic colleges and universities. In an earlier era, one of the unspoken
missions of Catholic higher education was to provide educational opportunities
and a pathway to the middle class for Catholics—especially Catholic
immigrants. 77 Consistent with the original focus of the Sisters of Mercy but also
consistent with expectations for women of the era in which they were founded,

74. See supra Part II.
75. See, e.g., About Our Foundress The Educational Vision of Catherine McAuley, ST.
JOSEPH’S COLLEGE THEOLOGY BLOG (Aug. 2, 2015), https://blogs.sjcme.edu/theology/about-ourfoundress-the-educational-vision-of-catherine-mcauley/ [https://perma.cc/7NZA-CRFA].
76. See Member Institutions, CONFERENCE FOR MERCY HIGHER EDUCATION,
http://www.mercyhighered.org/member-institutions/index.html [https://perma.cc/GH4A-GHBY]
(last accessed Nov. 8, 2018). This website contains links to each of the institutions, and each
institution provides its own history.
77. See, e.g., John M. Breen & Lee J. Strang, The Road Not Taken: Catholic Legal Education
at the Middle of the Twentieth Century, 51 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 553, 589 (2011) (noting large
number of Catholic immigrants and members of lower socioeconomic classes at Catholic
institutions of higher education and asserting that the institutions “took seriously their commitment
to the advancement of the underprivileged”).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

414

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 63:401

most Mercy colleges focused on programs in healthcare (principally nursing)
and education (principally teaching). 78
In other respects, however, Mercy higher education has deviated from other
Catholic education, especially the major “brand” for Catholic education in the
United States, Jesuit education. The biggest differences concern reputation,
wealth, and curriculum. Several Jesuit institutions are rich, elite, national
universities, 79 enjoying billion-dollar endowments, 80 storied faculty and
alumni, 81 affluent and well-prepared students, and considerable influence in
American public life. In contrast, Mercy institutions today tend to be non-elite
regional and local institutions with small endowments and less affluent students.
Jesuit universities typically are comprehensive liberal arts universities with
traditional professional schools (law, theology, medicine). Most Mercy colleges
and universities are liberal arts institutions with longstanding professional
programs in teacher education and nursing. 82
These differences have deep roots, tracing back even to the early days of
each Order. The first difference is gender: the Jesuits are a male order, and the
Sisters of Mercy are a female congregation; the institutions sponsored by them
began as all-male or all-female institutions. This difference alone explains many
78. For example, my own institution, University of Detroit Mercy, was once two separate
institutions: University of Detroit, a Jesuit institution, and Mercy College of Detroit, which was
established in 1941 “to prepare young women for careers in nursing and teaching so that they might
contribute intelligently and effectively to the welfare of society.” See University History,
UNIVERSITY OF DETROIT MERCY, http://udmercy.edu/about/history.php [https://perma.cc/HXL3T6SH] (last accessed Apr. 15, 2019). A search of the websites of other Mercy colleges and
universities reveals similar origin stories.
79. For example, Georgetown University and Boston College are both Jesuit institutions.
80. As of 2017, Georgetown University, Boston College, and St. Louis University each had
endowments exceeding one billion dollars. See US & Canadian Institutions Listed by FY 2017
Endowment Market Value & Change in Endowment Market Value from FY 2016 to FY 2017, NATL.
ASS’N OF COLLEGE & UNIV. BUSINESS OFFICERS & COMMONFUND INSTITUTE (available at
https://www.nacubo.org/-/media/Nacubo/Documents/EndowmentFiles/2017-Endowment-MarketValues.ashx?la=en&hash=E71088CDC05C76FCA30072DA109F91BBC10B0290 [https://perma.
cc/X9L8-LHAB]) (last accessed Nov. 26, 2018).
81. At Georgetown University, the Walsh School for Foreign Service alone has produced a
US President (William Jefferson Clinton), a Solicitor General of the United States (Paul Clement),
CEOs of major corporations, and a plethora of US ambassadors, members of the US Congress, and
state legislators. See Prominent Alumni, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY WALSH SCHOOL OF FOREIGN
SERVICE, https://sfs.georgetown.edu/alumni/prominent-alumni/ [https://perma.cc/N84D-LSYS]
(last accessed Nov. 8, 2018). Similarly, Boston College has produced United States Senators, high
level cabinet officials, CEOs, and prominent athletes and entertainers. See About BC: Notable
Alumni, BOSTON COLLEGE, https://www.bc.edu/bc-web/about/notable-alumni.html [https://perma.
cc/SR6P-EKTV] (last accessed Nov. 8, 2018).
82. Note the relationship between gender, curricular differences, and institutional wealth.
Mercy institutions trained women to be nurses and teachers, two occupations open to women. But
teachers and nurses rarely get rich, become United States Senators, or create endowed chairs in
academic departments.
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of the wealth and status disparities that exist between Jesuit and Mercy colleges
and universities.
Other differences also account for the divergent paths. Both the Jesuits and
the Sisters of Mercy founded and operated schools almost from their
beginnings. 83 However, Ignatius of Loyola and the early members of the Society
of Jesus were educated at the University of Paris, probably the most elite
educational institution of its day. 84 Although the Jesuits initially did not plan to
be an educational order, at a certain point they “formally and professedly
designated the staffing and management of schools a true ministry of the order,
indeed its primary ministry.” 85 Moreover, such education was primarily
intended for “boys and young men who envisaged a worldly career” rather than
a career as a priest. 86 The schools quickly became institutions for the sons of the
elite or for those who aspired to prominence. 87
In contrast, though highly intelligent and literate, Catherine McCauley did
not receive an elite education. 88 Moreover, as noted above, the early schools
operated by the Sisters of Mercy were for girls—mostly poor girls—and the
principal motivation for these schools was to provide girls and young women
the skills necessary to support themselves and their children. 89 These girls were
not being prepared for leadership positions in society but for subsistence. The
pension schools for middle-class girls and the women’s colleges and universities
did offer education in the liberal arts, but professional training was for
occupations historically defined as female.
Another difference is rooted in the different personalities and motivations of
Ignatius and Catherine. Ignatius of Loyola turned from his life as a soldier and
minor nobleman when he read lives of the saints while recovering from a battle

83. For an extremely brief description of the beginnings of Mercy-sponsored schools, see
supra note 42-43 and accompanying text. For a fuller discussion of the beginnings of Jesuitsponsored education, see generally John W. O’Malley, How the First Jesuits Became Involved in
Education, in A JESUIT EDUCATION READER 43 (George W. Traub ed., Loyola Press 2008).
84. O’Malley, supra note 83, at 50 (“The original ten founding members of the [Jesuits] were,
cumulatively, an extraordinarily learned group, all graduates of the University of Paris, which was
still the most prestigious academic institution in Europe.”).
85. Id. at 44.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 55 (“[W]hile the Jesuits of course had no idea of what we today call ‘upward social
mobility,’ the schools in fact acted in some instances as an opportunity for precisely that.”).
O’Malley realizes this was never the intention of the early Jesuits, who operated tuition-free
schools. However, the focus on liberal arts—Latin, Greek, literature, etc.—may have caused some
less affluent parents to balk, preferring a “more ‘practical’ education in the trades or in commercial
skills.” Id. at 54-55.
88. SULLIVAN, supra note 22, at 22.
89. See supra note 42-43 and accompanying text.
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injury. 90 He grew to identify with the saints, but the nature of his identification
had not changed: he moved from one heroic identification to another, from an
identification with military heroes to one with heroes of the Christian faith. 91
In contrast, Catherine identified with the marginalized themselves. To be
sure, she also identified with caregivers, but this identification doesn’t strike me
as an heroic identification: Mrs. Callaghan’s care for Dublin’s poor was quiet
and unobtrusive, not calling attention to itself. In other words, the focus was
more on the needs of the cared for than on the ego needs of the caregiver. Both
approaches have their merits–those who identify with heroes often accomplish
heroic things–but one might imagine the universities of an Order founded in part
out of a desire for the heroic would be elite institutions full of students with
dreams of (intellectual, moral, artistic, etc.) heroism. 92 And one might imagine
the colleges and universities of a congregation founded in part out of an
identification with the destitute and their caregivers to be full of students who
find gratification in caring for others.
The historical and current realities of Mercy higher education do not form
an ending point for consideration of Mercy identity. Recent decades have seen
a growing scholarly conversation regarding Mercy identity in higher education.
B.

Scholarly Reflection on Mercy Identity in Higher Education

Only in recent decades has there been a systematic effort to identify the
distinguishing features of Mercy higher education. The lack of such an effort in
the past is hardly surprising: such institutions often were run largely by Sisters
of Mercy whose own religious formation influenced the institutions both directly
and indirectly. 93 Given that, introspection regarding the mission of Mercy
institutions simply wasn’t necessary.

90. See, e.g., RONALD MODRAS, IGNATIAN HUMANISM 7-10 (2004) (describing Ignatius’
conversion).
91. Ignatius appears to have moved beyond this heroic identification later in life. See, e.g.,
RON HANSEN, THE PILGRIM: ST. IGNATIUS OF LOYOLA, IN THE IGNATIAN SPIRITUALITY READER
40 (George W. Traub ed., Loyola Press 2008) (“Ignatius was then fifty and far different from the
man he’d fantasized he’d be when he was a page to Spanish royalty, or a pilgrim to the Holy Land,
or a philosopher at the Sorbonne. . . . Ignatius surely imagined a grander fate than that of fifteen
years of grinding office and managerial work . . . . We hear no regret in his letters, however.”).
92. Of course, this view considerably oversimplifies both Jesuit and Mercy institutions, not to
mention the orders that sponsor them. Both Jesuits and Jesuit institutions have engaged in rigorous
critique and revisioning of Jesuit colleges and universities. See, e.g., A JESUIT EDUCATION READER
(George W. Traub ed., Loyola Univ. Press. 2008) (containing essays about how Jesuit colleges and
universities might better fulfill their missions).
93. See Conference for Mercy Higher Education, CMHE History (Aug. 19, 2018),
http://www.mercyhighered.org/history.html [https://perma.cc/P535-DNA7] (“Until a short
memory ago, the Mercy colleges and universities in the US were led, managed, and staffed in
majority by Sisters of Mercy.”).
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This is a different era—one of fewer women religious (sisters), 94 more
career options for women, and integration of Roman Catholics into mainstream
American life. These changes prompted several existential questions for Mercy
institutions of higher education: In what ways are we, or should we be,
distinctive? How do we preserve this identity in an era characterized by less
involvement from members of the congregation and by rising secularism within
society?
This section focuses on three major efforts to characterize Mercy higher
education: (1) a Discussion Paper by the Conference on Mercy Higher Education
(the “CMHE”); 95 (2) a response paper by Dr. Mary Sullivan; 96 and (3) a short
paper by Dr. Margaret Farley. 97
The 2004 Discussion Paper by the CMHE, Mercy Higher Education:
Culture and Characteristics, carries forward Catherine McAuley’s special
concern for women and children. In fact, the “promotion of compassion and
justice towards those with less, especially women and children” 98 is one of the
four hallmarks of Mercy higher education. 99 Compassion and justice should be
promoted both inside and outside the classroom, “through action and
education.” 100 Neither action nor education can exist in isolation. Absent
education, action can all too often be simple-minded and ineffective:
“Catherine’s approach to social problems was two-fold: address the need as well
as its root cause. Ministering to those in need without the accompanying action,
praxis, to seek remediation of the causes, however worthwhile, is not
sufficient.” 101 Accordingly, the Discussion Paper repeatedly emphasizes that
Mercy institutions must treat as integral some form of “introduction to social
analysis and skill development in social transformation.” 102 Moreover, skills in
social analysis should be imparted to students early in their course of study so
that they enjoy opportunities to exercise these skills. 103 Finally, the Discussion

94. Id.
95. Conference for Mercy Higher Education, Mercy Higher Education: Culture and
Characteristics (2004) [hereinafter Discussion Paper].
96. Mary C. Sullivan, Catherine McAuley and the Characteristics of Mercy Higher Education,
16 The MAST Journal 2, 18 (2006).
97. Margaret A. Farley, Wisdom, Dignity, and Justice: Higher Education as a Work of Mercy
(last accessed Aug. 19, 2018) www.mercyhighered.org/resources/ewExternalFiles/wdj.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3YPY-GCQ9].
98. Discussion Paper, supra note 95.
99. The other identified hallmarks are regard for the dignity of the person, academic
excellence, and education of the whole person. Id. at 1. These three hallmarks likely characterize
(or are aspirational for) virtually all Catholic higher education and probably most broadly
humanistic education. The commitment to women, children, and the poor is unique.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
102. Id. at 3.
103. Discussion Paper, supra note 95 at 15.
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Paper gives service learning a privileged place, urging Mercy institutions to
integrate it into the curriculum. 104
The centrality of compassion and justice for women and children is
distinctively Mercy. The very reason the Sisters of Mercy sponsor educational
institutions is to “address their enduring concerns,” 105 and “Catherine
McAuley’s preferential love for the poor and her special concern for women” 106
continue to enjoy privileged status within the congregation. More broadly,
Mercy ministries focus on “all areas of human services from housing and
homeless shelters, to hospitals and hospices, to pastoral ministries and diocesan
offices.” 107 This close, tender focus on the human person and on care for the
human person is, therefore, a defining characteristic of Mercy higher education.
Dr. Mary Sullivan has proposed three additional hallmarks beyond those
articulated in the CMHE Discussion Paper:
a) “Religious learning and spiritual development, through frequent courses
in Christian theology and the Scriptures, courses in other religions,
Catholic liturgical celebrations, and other religious events;” 108
b) Education in and a commitment to mercifulness, as revealed in the Mercy
of God made manifest in Jesus Christ;” 109
c) “The strenuous effort to give good example, by modeling, personally and
corporately, all the values it seeks to promote through its educational and
other endeavors.” 110
Each of these three hallmarks is rooted in Catherine McAuley’s own educational
values, as expressed in her drafts of the original Rule of the Sisters of Mercy, as
well as her letters and other writings. According to Dr. Sullivan, Catherine’s
“enduring educational values” 111 include the “fundamental necessity of
Christian learning and spiritual development,” 112 the “primacy to be always
given to mercifulness and spiritual consolation,” 113 and the “demanding effort
to ‘practice what we teach/preach,’ i.e., to be ourselves, personally and
institutionally, insofar as humanly possible, examples of the Mercy heritage we
claim to promote and transmit.” 114 Of course, these values exist alongside
Catherine’s special commitment, which transcended education—to girls and

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 15-16.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 9-10 (citing the Constitutions of the Sisters of Mercy of the Americas ##5-7).
Discussion Paper, supra note 95, at 3.
Sullivan, supra note 96, at 24.
Id. at 25.
Id. at 26.
Id. at 18.
Id.
Sullivan, supra note 96, at 18.
Id.
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women. 115 For Dr. Sullivan, the three additional proposed hallmarks of Mercy
education follow from these enduring educational values.
First, Dr. Sullivan believes that Mercy institutions of higher education
should emphasize religious learning and spiritual development, both inside and
outside the classroom. Catherine McAuley believed the principal purpose of
Mercy education was spiritual consolation. Yes, education should impart
knowledge, develop students’ intellectual skills, prepare students for the
workplace, and so forth, but the primary purpose of education is to “comfort,
encourage, and console [students] in the most thorough and lasting way
possible.” 116 Given this, religious learning and spiritual development are at the
core of the Mercy educational mission.
An explicitly Christian identity and emphasis on religious learning and
spiritual development exists in an atmosphere of openness to, welcoming of, and
respect for those from other traditions. Dr. Sullivan recognizes—and believes
Catherine McAuley would herself embrace—the “ecumenical and interfaith
respect, aspirations, and understandings of the present time.” 117 Nonetheless, Dr.
Sullivan believes that Mercy institutions should not allow this respect and
collaboration to “silence or diminish a courteous emphasis on and provision for
explicitly Christian and, where necessary, Catholic religious education and
experience.” 118 Dr. Sullivan suggests this emphasis is possible through a variety
of religion courses from various faith traditions, through frequent liturgical
celebrations, and through opportunities for prayer. 119
Second, Dr. Sullivan believes that Mercy institutions should be
characterized by a commitment to mercifulness. She describes this principally
as an institutional attitude that, while upholding high standards, values
“forgiveness, gentleness, sensitivity, empathy towards distress, charity of mind
and heart, sympathy, self-sacrifice for the sake of another’s need, loving
kindness, humility.” 120 She also acknowledges that, at times, this focus on
mercifulness will influence “the curricula, the content of courses, and again
where appropriate, their methods and objectives.” 121
Finally, Dr. Sullivan asserts that Mercy institutions should be characterized
by a strong commitment to modeling the Mercy values the institution seeks to
transmit to students. In other words, faculty members and administrators—all
employees—should strive to embody the Mercy charism. As Dr. Sullivan
documents, Catherine believed that “the first means . . . to render us most useful

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 23.
Id. at 24.
Id.
Sullivan, supra note 96, at 24-25.
Id. at 25.
Id.
Id.
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to others . . . is to give good example.” 122 Sullivan elaborates on the importance
of this insight to the educational process:
The challenge these words present to Mercy educators may not have fully
dawned upon us. We are to be and do what we teach. If we wish to teach
mercifulness, we must speak and act mercifully toward others. If we wish to
teach forgiveness, we must forgive others and ask for their forgiveness. . . . If
we wish to teach others to serve and respect those who are economically poor,
we must first serve and respect them ourselves. This is the primary principle and
method of Mercy education as Catherine McAuley conceived and practiced
it. 123

In short, “[i]f students do not see evidences of the characteristics of a Mercy
education in their teachers’ example, as well as in their words, such
characteristics will be only half affirmed, if at all.” 124
Feminist theologian and ethicist Dr. Margaret Farley approaches the
question of Mercy higher education differently. Both the CMHE Discussion
Paper and Dr. Mary Sullivan’s response examine Catherine McAuley’s life and
the priorities of the Sisters of Mercy and derive from those sources defining
attributes of Mercy higher education. Dr. Farley asks a different question: what
is required for higher education to be a work of mercy? 125
Dr. Farley asserts that higher education is a work of mercy when wisdom,
dignity, justice, and mercy are held together. 126 Her starting point is that the
“central goal of higher education is to grow in wisdom.” 127 Moreover, she
considers all higher education a form of initiation into a culture. However, a
focus on wisdom and on cultural initiation is not inconsistent with professional
training and preparation, that is, with preparing persons to “advance the skills
and services that a society needs.” 128 In her view, at the heart of real wisdom is
learning—through a variety of disciplines—”about the interrelationships of all
beings and the dignity at the heart of every person.” 129 This learning involves
not merely a study of human achievements but also an encounter with human
suffering. 130

122. Id. at 26.
123. Sullivan, supra note 96, at 23.
124. Id. at 26.
125. Farley, supra note 97, at 3.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 4.
129. Id.
130. Farley, supra note 97, at 4. (“Learning of human successes without learning of human
pain, or learning about conquerors without learning about the exploited and the conquered, learning
about leaders and their ideas without learning about the marginalized and the poor, led and still
may lead to the estrangement of an educated elite from the lives of the desperate and from the
worldwide phenomenon of human misery.”).
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For Dr. Farley, the core wisdom concerning the “concrete reality of human
persons” is that “all of us are ends in ourselves. . . . [and] are to be treated as
ends, not only as means.” 131 We are ends in ourselves for two reasons: our
freedom, that is, the notion that “our selves and our actions are in an important
sense our own. . . . [and] we can determine the meaning of our own lives;” 132
and our relationality, that is, “our capacities to know and be known, love and be
loved.” 133 This freedom and this relationality are interconnected:
Freedom and relationality, moreover, do not compete; they are intimately
connected. Relationships make freedom of self-determination possible (for
without them we cannot grow in freedom); but freedom is ultimately for the sake
of choosing relationships—of choosing what and how to love. Herein lies the
basis of human dignity and the requirement to grow in wisdom regarding what
humans need. 134

And out of this wisdom, this knowledge of human dignity, “arise imperatives of
human justice.” 135 Finally—and as described more fully in Part VI, infra—
justice requires mercy, just as mercy requires justice. 136
These three scholarly reflections are necessary threads in the tapestry of
legal education in the Mercy tradition. However, these threads do not speak
directly to legal education. For that we must turn to a discussion of religiously
affiliated law schools, focusing on Jesuit identity within legal education.
V. THE RELIGIOUSLY AFFILIATED LAW SCHOOL: REFLECTIONS ON JESUIT
IDENTITY IN LEGAL EDUCATION
Any articulation of Mercy identity in legal education does not take place in
a vacuum. Supplementing discussion of the Mercy charism in higher education
is a lively literature concerning Jesuit identity at American law schools. 137 If
course, this literature exists alongside broader discussions concerning Catholic
law schools more generally and, indeed, concerning all religiously affiliated law

131. Id. at 5.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Farley, supra note 97, at 5.
136. Id. at 7-8.
137. See, e.g., C. Michael Bryce, Teaching Justice to Law Students: The Legacy of Ignatian
Education and Commitment to Justice and Justice Learning in 21st Century Legal Education, 43
GONZ. L. REV. 577 (2007) (arguing that clinical education and mentoring are best tools to promote
justice within Jesuit law schools); Andrew Moore, Contact and Concepts: Educating Students at
Jesuit Law Schools, 41 GONZ. L. REV. 459 (2006) (discussing best means within law school
curriculum of “forming men and women for others”); Daniel J. Morrissey, Bringing the Messiah
Through Law: Legal Education at the Jesuit Schools, 48 ST. LOUIS UNIV. L.J. 549 (2004)
(examining the loss within Jesuit law schools of a connection to the Catholic cultural and
intellectual tradition).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

422

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 63:401

schools. Scholarship on Jesuit and other religiously affiliated law schools
necessarily informs my thinking on Mercy legal education. This section
considers two major, and contrasting, views of Jesuit legal education—those of
Professors John Breen and Gregory Kalscheur.
A.

Professor John Breen, the Catholic Intellectual Tradition, and the Law
School Curriculum

Professor John Breen’s vision for Jesuit legal education forms the starting
point for contemporary discussion. Over the course of three articles, he makes a
positive case for a renewed focus on traditional classroom study of substantive
justice, including but not limited to understandings of justice gleaned from
natural law and the larger Catholic intellectual tradition. 138
Professor Breen’s positive vision is an outgrowth of his critique of Jesuit
legal education. He probably is foremost among the critics who charge that (a)
Jesuit law schools lack any distinctive character, and (b) they try to cover their
lack of distinctiveness by extolling the virtues of their clinical programs. 139
This lack of distinctiveness begins with Jesuit schools’ lack of attention to
justice—an inattention that mirrors that of the rest of the legal academy.
Professor Breen begins with an anecdote from his own Jesuit institution, Loyola
University of Chicago School of Law. In a “moment of incredulous reflection”
during a panel discussion, a third-year law student noted that “this was the first
time in any of her classes that she could recall any meaningful discussion of
justice.” 140 The student found this absence of concerns of justice from the law
school classroom “especially disappointing because she had attended a Jesuit
university for her undergraduate studies where such discussions had regularly
taken place, and . . . she had been attracted to Loyola’s law school because of its
Jesuit identity.” 141 In short, Breen’s starting point is the apparent invisibility of
justice concerns in legal education generally.
He then identifies this lack of attention to substantive justice as a major
cause of the well documented malaise afflicting the legal profession: “[T]he
fundamental problem that confounds the legal profession today is that many

138. See John M. Breen, Justice and Legal Education: A Critique, 36 LOY. CHI. L.J. 383 (2005)
[hereinafter Justice and Legal Education]; John M. Breen, The Air in the Balloon: Further Notes
on Catholic and Jesuit Identity in Legal Education, 43 GONZ. L. REV. 41 (2007) [hereinafter Air
in the Balloon]; John M. Breen, Action as the Fruit of Contemplation: A Reply to Bryce, Donnelly,
Kalscheur, and Nussbaum, 43 GONZ. L. REV. 645 (2007) [hereinafter Action as the Fruit of
Contemplation].
139. See, e.g. Air in the Balloon, supra note 138, at 42-44 (“Jesuit legal education, as it is
currently practiced in this country, must be judged as a failure based on the very standards of
success set forth by the Society of Jesus. . . . [T]he claim of Jesuit distinctiveness in legal education
simply cannot stand up to scrutiny.”).
140. Justice and Legal Education, supra note 138, at 383.
141. Id.
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lawyers no longer see a connection between the ordinary work they perform for
clients and the virtue of justice.” 142 And he observes that law schools lay the
foundation for this malaise and alienation by teaching students to divorce their
own moral beliefs, including those about justice, from their understanding of
law 143 and by (perhaps unwittingly) teaching students that “the practice of law
requires a kind of agnosticism, and that the consummate professional is the
consummate agnostic for whom all justice is relative.” 144
Jesuit law schools are not exempt from this grim portrait of the state of
American legal education. Jesuits’ “public statements of self-identity” indicate
their hope and expectation that “graduates of Jesuit universities will gain a deep
appreciation for and commitment to justice in the course of their Jesuit
education.” 145 However, students’ actual experiences at Jesuit law schools
contrast starkly with the Jesuits’ public proclamations about justice. 146
In describing his positive vision for Jesuit legal education, Professor Breen
traces the modern concern of the Jesuits, beginning with the leadership of Pedro
Arrupe, with issues of social justice and with being men and women for
others. 147 Graduates of Jesuit institutions should strive “‘to be an agent of change
in society; not merely resisting unjust structures and arrangements, but actively
undertaking to reform them.’” 148 Indeed, for the Jesuits, the “‘promotion of
justice and liberation of the oppressed is a constitutive element’” of Christian
mission. 149
As Professor Breen observes, this concern for justice should be central to
the Jesuit educational mission. For Jesuits, education—an “‘interplay between
experience, reflection, decision and action’”—is, at its heart, preparation for
building a more just world. 150 According to Breen, law schools have
demonstrated this concern for justice principally (perhaps exclusively) through
the clinics they offer. 151
This relegation of justice concerns to the law school clinics is, for Breen,
simply inadequate. Some of the reasons he gives are now outdated: for example,

142. Id. at 385.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Justice and Legal Education, supra note 138, at 387.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 387-91.
148. Id. at 388.
149. Id.
150. Justice and Legal Education, supra note 138, at 389–90.
151. Id. at 392–94. Professor Breen also notes that, apart from clinics, Jesuit law schools’
commitment to justice is principally rhetorical and is expressed through lip service in web and other
promotional materials. Id. at 391–92.
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he notes that most law students will not take a clinic, and that most law schools
will not require clinics. 152 However, this is not his principal concern.
To be sure, “[t]he provision of legal services to the poor and disadvantaged
undoubtedly makes a valuable contribution to a school’s Jesuit identity.” 153 But
this contribution is “at best . . . [an] incomplete attempt to satisfy the Jesuit
demand for the promotion of justice.” 154 Among other things, Professor Breen
says, “clinical instruction does not teach students to think about justice. . . . [but]
encourages an affective rather than an analytical approach to situations involving
injustice. . . . [W]here any matter is in any way complicated, empathy is no
substitute for critical thinking.” 155 In further support of his point, he states that
a university is an intellectual endeavor and so “the Jesuit identity of a university
must be manifest in the intellectual work that the university performs, namely,
the dissemination of knowledge and the search for truth.” 156
Professor Breen’s solution to this issue rests principally in additions to the
standard law school curriculum. At the least, Jesuit law schools should teach
students to think analytically about issues of justice by requiring first-year
students to take “an introductory course in moral theory and jurisprudence,” then
requiring upper level students to take some more advanced course (e.g., feminist
legal theory). 157 The introductory course should include some form of “serious
engagement with the Catholic intellectual tradition.” 158 This tradition often
“challenge[s] the dominant conception of justice in American law.” 159
According to Professor Breen, the mainstream view within American law is that
human beings are “radically autonomous individuals who create value through
the exercise of individual choice” and that this view “has led to an impoverished
discourse concerning the common good and an understanding of justice in law

152. Id. at 396. All of his articles were written in the years prior to ABA Standard 303(a) (3),
which requires all law students at ABA-accredited schools to take six experiential learning credits.
See ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, 2018-2019 STANDARDS
AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS 16 (2018), https://www.american
bar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/misc/legal_education/Standards/2018-2019ABAStandards
forApprovalofLawSchools/2018-2019-aba-standards-chapter3.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.
cc/Q7VG-WXYU].
153. Justice and Jesuit Legal Education, supra note 138, at 395.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 396–97 (“think” emphasized in original; other emphasis added).
156. Id. at 399. One might reasonably question Professor Breen’s condescending (in my view)
assumptions about the intellectual value of clinics. Implicit (and sometimes explicit) in his critiques
are assumptions that clinics engage students affectively but not intellectually, and that, though kind
of sweet, the work of clinics is not part of the “real” intellectual work of a university. Admittedly I
am exaggerating a bit. However, other critics agree that he underestimates the value of clinic
education. See, e.g., Bryce, supra note 137 at 605–06 (discussing intellectual value of clinics).
157. Justice and Legal Education, supra note 138, at 401.
158. Id. at 405.
159. Id. at 407.
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that is almost entirely procedural in nature.” 160 In contrast, the Catholic
intellectual tradition takes the substantive stance that a legal system and, indeed,
society as a whole, must be judged by how it treats its most vulnerable
members. 161 Moreover, persons are understood not merely as rights-bearers, but
as possessing both political and moral responsibilities; this means that justice
requires not merely the recognition of rights, but also “the duty to support the
common good of society.” 162 The introductory course in moral theory and
jurisprudence would introduce students to this view of justice, along with several
others. 163
Other legal educators agree that Professor Breen’s concern for the mission
and integrity of Jesuit law schools is “timely, welcome, and important,” 164 but
reject his diagnosis and proposals for reasons both substantive and practical. 165
Professor Gregory Kalscheur is among Professor Breen’s foremost critics and
has articulated an alternate view of Jesuit legal education.
B.

Professor Gregory Kalscheur and Jesuit Legal Education as Formation

Professor Gregory Kalscheur, himself both a Jesuit and a law professor,
takes issue with both Professor Breen’s conception of the Catholic intellectual
tradition and his vision for legal education. 166 These critiques are related: a
different understanding of the Catholic intellectual tradition results in a different
conception of Jesuit legal education.
Professor Kalscheur first takes issue with Breen’s view of the Catholic
intellectual tradition as a set of doctrines. “[I]t is a mistake to reduce justice and
engagement with the Catholic intellectual tradition to a set of concepts to be
talked about, rather than as virtues to be lived.” 167 Rather than being a body of
doctrine, the Catholic intellectual tradition is a way of proceeding.

160. Id. at 407–08.
161. Id. at 408.
162. Justice and Legal Education, supra note 138, at 408–09.
163. Throughout the three articles, Professor Breen never asserts that only the Catholic
intellectual tradition should enjoy a place at the table. In fact, he argues strongly for exposing
students to a variety of perspectives. For example, he points to Deborah Rhodes’ work on
incorporating ethical perspectives across the curriculum. See Air in the Balloon, supra note 138, at
74.
164. Gregory A. Kalscheur, Conversation in Aid of a “Conspiracy” for Truth: A Candid
Discussion about Jesuit Law Schools, Justice, and Engaging the Catholic Intellectual Tradition,
43 GONZ. L. REV. 559, 560 (2007).
165. See, e.g., Kalscheur, supra note 164; see also, e.g., Thomas More Donnelly, The Leaven
of the World: Serving the Poor is Neither the Air in the Balloon Nor the Cherry on the Sundae, 43
GONZ. L. REV. 607 (2007) (arguing that clinics, not a ‘window-dressing’ course on jurisprudence,
are the best starting point for teaching students about justice).
166. Kalscheur, supra note 164, at 562. Professor Kalscheur also notes that “the tone and style
of engagement that one adopts with respect to this issue is critical.” Id.
167. Id. at 563.
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The Catholic tradition of virtue ethics understands the moral virtues—including
the virtue of justice—as matters of character. A virtue is a rightly ordered love
involving an integration of head and heart, of intellect and affect. In other words,
a virtue is a quality of character that disposes a person habitually to see the world
in certain ways and to respond to the world in certain ways. 168

According to Professor Kalscheur, the starting point for the Catholic
intellectual tradition is a conviction “that reality is purposeful and imbued with
meaning and that reality’s purpose and meaning are summed up in the unity of
all things with God patterned on the unity between the divine and the human
embodied in Christ.” 169 From this starting point follows an “intrinsically
religious intellectual dynamism of all human inquiry toward ultimate questions
of meaning, coherence, and truth.” 170
He asserts that four traits characterize the Catholic intellectual tradition:
1) First, the “conviction that faith and reason are mutually illuminating and
are united in the search for truth;” 171
2) Second, a sacramentalism that recognizes that “the pursuit of truth in any
discipline is a holy activity;” 172
3) Third, “[o]penness to the “analogical imagination (a tendency to see
things in terms of both/and rather than in terms of either/or);” 173 and
4) Fourth, reverence for human dignity and a commitment to justice and the
common good. 174
In short, Professor Kalscheur points to a living tradition, the substantive
particulars of which may evolve as human knowledge develops. 175 Moreover,
this tradition has and continues to develop “in dialogue with the full range of
human cultures and intellectual traditions.” 176
Just as Professor Kalscheur’s understanding of the Catholic intellectual
tradition differs from that of Professor Breen, his notion of what this means for
Jesuit legal education also differs. Although he expresses no objection to a
course on jurisprudence, he does not consider such a course central to the Jesuit
mission in legal education. 177 For Kalscheur, the cardinal virtues of a Jesuit law
168. Id. at 564.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 564-65.
171. Kalscheur, supra note 164 at 565.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 566.
174. Id.
175. See id. at 566 (“[T]he Catholic intellectual tradition is a dynamic, living, ongoing, not-yetcompleted conversation and is not properly understood as a static body of knowledge.”).
176. Kalscheur, supra note 164 at 566.
177. Id. at 567 (“[T]he Jesuit law school does not promote justice and the common good solely,
or even most effectively, by demanding that students learn about justice from a Catholic perspective
as one component of a new required course.”).
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school are both justice and “intellectual solidarity,” that is, “[t]aking other
persons, societies, and cultures seriously enough to engage them in conversation
and debate about what makes life worth living, including what will make for the
good of the city and the globe.” 178
But justice within the Jesuit context, says Professor Kalscheur, “is better
understood as a way of living that promotes the common good.” 179 And that way
of living is achieved through the process of formation: the goal of Jesuit legal
education is to form a “certain kind of person committed to serving the common
good of society.” 180 Therefore, the questions Jesuit law schools should ask in
assessing whether they are fulfilling their mission are:
Do students leave our law schools more responsive to the needs of humanity or
less so? What sorts of human beings do our students become during their time
in our law schools? Do the students we educate come to embody a commitment
to justice [to doing justice rather than merely analyzing it]? 181

And the starting point for formation is knowing our students and ourselves:
If the law school hopes to prepare women and men who are moved to a
constructive, responsible, and loving use of their knowledge, then we have to
take seriously the hopes and desires that brought the students to us, as well as
the hopes and desires that move their hearts as they encounter the human realities
that lie at the heart of the legal enterprise. And if we hope to educate not just
good lawyers, but lawyers who lead good lives, then all of us have to continually
ask ourselves what kinds of people we are becoming as we immerse ourselves
in the study and teaching and practice of the law. 182

But formation also takes place through enculturation, and Professor Kalscheur
sees Jesuit legal education as ideally embodying a set of cultural conditions that
are conducive to formation of lawyers concerned for the common good. In his
view, five cultural characteristics should predominate: (1) a humane culture in
the classroom and in the larger law school community; (2) a culture faithful to
the idea of a university—a place where all authentic human questions, including
questions of faith, are part of the conversation; (3) a culture committed to
promoting human dignity and the common good; (4) a culture of dialogue and
intellectual solidarity, in which people with different life experiences and
perspectives speak and listen to one another with the goal of discerning the
common good; and (5) a culture of discernment and vocation, the notion that

178. Id. (quoting David Hollenbach, Address at Loyola University Chicago, The Catholic
University and the Common Good (Nov. 6, 2007) (available at http://www.luc.edu/ccity/hollen
bachtalk.html [https://perma.cc/T7D5-LWDC])).
179. Kalscheur, supra note 164, at 567.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 568.
182. Id. at 570.
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students are being formed to fulfill callings that arise from the deepest, holiest
desires of their hearts. 183
Professor Kalscheur’s approach has the virtue of depth and nuance, and—
perhaps necessarily given its virtues—lacks a certain clarity; Professor Breen’s
approach has the virtue of clarity, even if it risks a certain superficiality. Other
participants in this conversation have taken issue with Professor Breen’s
characterization of clinics and have argued that clinics are the best starting point
for thinking about justice, even if a course in jurisprudence or moral theory
might be useful. 184 Still others, most notably my colleague Andrew Moore, 185
have suggested compromise approaches that address many of Professor Breen’s
concerns.
Debates about the character of religiously affiliated law schools extend well
beyond Jesuit schools. For example, some have argued that Catholic law schools
must be radically restructured to embody a preferential option for the poor, as
opposed to the preferential option for the rich that virtually all American law
schools currently embody. 186 Others take still more radical positions. For
example, Thomas Shaffer has argued for “sectarian” law schools, meaning
religiously affiliated law schools that stand separate from wider civil society in
a variety of ways (think of the recent book The Benedict Option as applied to
law schools!). 187 Though a full discussion of his thought is beyond the scope of
this article, one of Shaffer’s points merits mention: in contrast to American legal
ethics and legal thinking, both religious ethics and feminist ethics are

183. Id. at 574-75.
184. See, e.g., Bryce, supra note 137.
185. Professor Moore is sympathetic to Professor Breen’s concerns, but does not think a
required jurisprudence course would effectively address those concerns. Instead, he proposes both
a “justice across the curriculum” requirement and an integrative seminar focused on justice; this
seminar would be a capstone experience following (and directly connected to) a clinical experience.
See Moore, supra note 137, at 470-73 (describing proposals).
186. See William Quigley, Seven Principles for Catholic Law Schools Serious about a
Preferential Option for the Poor, 1 U. St. Thomas L.J. 128, 129 (2003) (setting out principles by
which Catholic law schools may begin to embody a preferential option for the poor). The
preferential option for the poor is a well-established principle of Catholic social teaching. See, e.g.,
Pope Francis, Evangelii Gaudium (2013) (available at http://w2.vatican.va/content/dam/francesco/
pdf/apost_exhortations/documents/papa-francesco_esortazione-ap_20131124_evangelii-gaudium
_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/XH26-XMPP]) (“Without the preferential option for the poor, ‘the
proclamation of the Gospel . . . risks being misunderstood or submerged.’”).
187. See Thomas L. Shaffer, Erastian and Sectarian Arguments in Religiously Affiliated Law
Schools, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1859, 1869 (1993). Although Professor Shaffer’s article is twenty-five
years old, it presages contemporary social arguments about the Christian community more
generally. See, e.g., ROD DREHER, THE BENEDICT OPTION: A STRATEGY FOR CHRISTIANS IN A POSTCHRISTIAN NATION (2017) (proposing a “strategic withdrawal” from the world by Christians in
order to preserve Christian values and culture).
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communal. 188 I explore this insight more fully in the next section, which
articulates my vision for legal education in the Mercy tradition.
VI. A VISION FOR LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE MERCY TRADITION
Two major themes emerge from the source materials. The first, not
surprising given the name of the congregation, is the primacy of mercifulness:
Catherine McAuley believed mercy is the principal path by which we know God,
and she structured her life around that belief; the congregation’s core values of
compassionate service and social justice, as well as its articulation of the five
Critical Concerns, attest to mercy’s centrality; the major thinkers about Mercy
higher education also emphasize mercy. Thus, to be Mercy, a law school should
be deeply committed to mercifulness.
The second major theme is the centrality of women and girls. The Mercy
congregation was founded in large part as a ministry to women and girls, and
that mission has never changed. In short, an emphasis on women and girls is part
of the Mercy charism, and any institution, including a School of Law, that exists
under the sponsorship of the Sisters of Mercy should share that commitment.
Minor themes augment the major themes. The most significant of the minor
themes concerns the importance of identification in the process of professional
formation. Catherine McAuley’s life work—the opening and operation of the
House of Mercy—arose from her keen identification with poor women and girls,
with those who cared for the poor, and with Jesus himself. Dr. Mary Sullivan
points indirectly to the role of identification in formation when she asserts that
an “effort to give good example” should define Mercy higher education; this
statement recognizes that students will identify with us almost no matter what,
so our own values and behavior—who we show ourselves to be—are as
important to students’ professional identity formation as are the subjects we
teach. Finally, in writing about Jesuit legal education, Professor Kalscheur
prioritizes personal and professional formation—who both we and our students
become through the educational process. Given these sources, I believe another
mark of a Mercy legal education is careful attention to professional identity
formation and to the role that preexisting identifications play in that process.
What follows is a brief discussion of what these three commitments might
mean within a law school. I have tried to resist the urge to address every question
that may arise; this serves as a starting point.
A.

The Commitment to Mercifulness

The first defining feature of a Mercy law school should be its commitment
to mercy and mercifulness.

188. Shaffer, supra note 187, at 1873.
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Like the word justice, mercy is open to varying interpretations. A full
discussion of the many interpretive debates concerning mercy is beyond the
scope of this article. For purposes of examining the charism of a Mercy law
school, mercy within the Christian tradition is the appropriate starting point, and,
even here, my examination will be quite brief.
Within the Mercy universe, 189 Dr. Jayme Hennessy has argued that mercy
as Catherine McAuley practiced it is “the love that strives to restore or preserve
the dignity of the human person.” 190 Drawing on both Scripture and theological
reflection, 191 Dr. Hennessy asserts that human dignity is rooted in our creation
in the Image of God. 192 The mercy of Christ “restore[s] God’s image within the
human person, and it [is] through works of mercy that this image of God [is]
then reflected into the world.” 193 To early Church theologians, the failure to
practice mercy “obscured or impaired the humanity of both the person who was
suffering and the person who failed to love—and to act.” 194 In contrast, the
practice of mercy—the active recognition of and love for the Image of God
within another human—always requires the affirmation or restoration of human
dignity.
According to Dr. Hennessy, Catherine McAuley identified as a disciple of
the “crucified Christ,” that is, of a God who “entered into the chaos,
vulnerability, and suffering of human life to restore in our humanity the Image
of God.” 195 Catherine practiced this mercy by her care for and empowerment of
destitute women and children, and by her care for those working alongside
her. 196 The Mercy Institute has continued this work through its ministries in
education and health care and through its work on the Critical Concerns. 197 Dr.
Hennessy suggests that Mercy educational institutions can continue this work
189. Dr. Hennessy is a professor at Salve Regina, a Mercy institution located in Rhode Island.
See Salve Regina, Dr. Jayme Hennessy, https://salve.edu/users/dr-jayme-hennessy [https://perma.
cc/V94Z-NZJZ] (last accessed Aug. 20, 2018).
190. Jayme Hennessy, I Desire Mercy: The Theological Foundations for Examining the Role
of Mercy in Higher Education, in Life Within the Stream of Mercy: Mission Development for
Administration and Faculty 13, 16 (Conference for Mercy Higher Education 2009). This document
was self-published by the Conference for Mercy Higher Education; the author of this article has on
file a copy of Dr. Hennessy’s article.
191. Dr. Hennessy’s sources are wide-ranging and include, inter alia, the Bible (both Hebrew
Scriptures and New Testament), several papal encyclicals, and writings from early Church
theologian John Chrysostom, doctor of the Church Thomas Aquinas, liberation theologian Jon
Sobrino, and feminist theologian Margaret Farley. Of course, a full discussion of mercy within the
Christian tradition would merit its own library. However, Dr. Hennessy’s article focuses on the
concept of mercy for purposes of Mercy higher education, the relevance of which is obvious.
192. Id. at 16.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 17.
196. See supra Part I (describing Catherine’s work with poor women and children).
197. See supra Part III (describing Critical Concerns).
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through a process of formation such that students’ and employee’ “senses,
emotions, mind, and will are disposed toward perceiving, feeling, thinking, and
acting mercifully.” 198
Dr. Margaret Farley has explored the relationship between mercy and
justice. Her central argument is that mercy “both requires justice and makes it
possible.” 199 (Note the similarity to Professor Robin West’s insight, infra, about
the need for care to be just, and for justice to be caring. 200) Describing mercy as
a form of love, she notes that it can be helpful or harmful: what separates a
helpful, just mercy from an unhelpful, unjust mercy is the “concrete reality of
the beloved:” 201 “[T]he requirement for true mercy is . . . the wisdom to
understand well, insofar as we can, concrete realities, contexts, relationships,
and the claims they make on us in justice.” 202
But just as mercy requires justice, mercy enables justice:
Precisely because mercy involves beholding the value of others and suffering
with them in their need, it opens reality to the beholder; it offers a way of
“seeing” that evokes a moral response—to alleviate pain, provide assistance in
need, support in wellbeing. Mercy therefore illuminates justice and propels it to
action. 203

Finally, any discussion of mercy should include Jesuit theologian Jon
Sobrino’s powerful reflections. His starting point is the role of mercy in the life
of Jesus: Sobrino asserts that mercy was the central principle around which
Jesus’ life was structured, and that, therefore, our lives should imitate that
structure (if we wish to be fully human). 204 Mercy should be our starting and
ending points. However, properly understood, mercy connotes more than
compassion, more than mere sentiment, and certainly is not paternalism. Rather,
mercy is a basic attitude toward the suffering of another, whereby one reacts to
eradicate that suffering for the sole reason that it exists, and in the conviction
that, in this reaction to the ought-not-be of another’s suffering, one’s own being,
without any possibility of subterfuge, hangs in the balance. 205
The call to mercy is unequivocal: there is nothing “that might relativize it or
offer an escape from it.” 206 And what mercy requires for the poor, the oppressed,
and the outcast is radical: Jesus’ “‘social theory’ is guided by the principle that
198. Hennessy, supra note 190, at 20.
199. Farley, supra note 97, at 13.
200. See infra Part VI.B.
201. Farley, supra note 97, at 16.
202. Id. at 17.
203. Id. at 18.
204. SOBRINO, supra note 19, at 15–16 (“What we wish to set forth . . . is that the principle that
seems to us to be the most ‘structuring’ of all, as we examine Jesus’ life, is the element of mercy in
that life. Therefore it ought to be the ‘most structuring’ element of the life of the church, as well.”).
205. Id. at 18.
206. Id.
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massive unjust suffering must be pulled up by the roots.” 207 A church governed
by the principle of mercy will have a “theoretical and practical obsession with
indicating, and walking, effective paths to justice.” 208
Three insights strongly inform my view of what a commitment to
mercifulness means for legal education. The first is the understanding of mercy
as a love that works to preserve or restore human dignity. The second is the
insight shared by Jon Sobrino and Margaret Farley about the reciprocal
relationship of mercy to justice, especially the notion that mercy serves as the
impetus for persons to seek justice for others; in a sense, mercy precedes justice.
The third is related to the second: justice and care are interdependent, that is,
uncaring justice is unjust and unjust caring is uncaring. 209
These insights imply the following for a law school: students must be able
to see the crucified peoples of our society and world, that is, those whose dignity
has been denied. Just as Catherine McAuley placed the House of Mercy in a
wealthy area of Dublin, thus making the poor and their suffering impossible for
the rich to ignore, so must we ensure that suffering—especially human suffering
related directly to our legal system—is visible to our students. Seeing the
crucified peoples, students also must care; this is an affective experience and, at
times, an experience of identification. Finally, this seeing and caring should lead
to action: students should work to take the crucified people down from the cross
(which requires wisdom, education, and discernment).
Keeping these insights in mind, I offer some tentative and small suggestions
for how a law school in the Mercy tradition might fulfill its core commitment to
mercifulness.
1.

Reform of the First Year Curriculum

Most importantly, formation in mercifulness should begin with the first-year
curriculum. Recall Dr. Hennessy’s argument that Mercy education should form
persons who are disposed to perceive, feel, think, and act mercifully. Students
frequently are powerfully moved and deepened by their encounters with human
suffering during their clinical and externship experiences. Students’ journals in
externship courses bear witness to the profound influence of encounters with
suffering, deprivation, and injustice:
My job site is in the . . . Hall of Justice where legal issues pertaining to . . .
County Youth are adjudicated. I am not sure if you have ever been to the . . .
Hall of Justice, but it is a pretty depressing place for a number of reasons. First,
the building is almost entirely in disrepair . . . the air conditioning was out all
week (with an indefinite repair date), the elevators do not work (another
indefinite repair date), and I have yet to find a bathroom where at least one of

207. Id. at 20.
208. Id. at 25.
209. See infra Part VI.B (describing the work of legal scholar Robin West).
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the stall doors has not been kicked in. The second reason I found this place to be
depressing is due to the reasons that people are there in the first place. Because
this courthouse deals only in juvenile matters, it stands to reason that most of
[the] people that are there because their family has hit rock bottom in one way
or another. On my first day, one of the attorneys invited me down to observe her
delinquency hearing. During the hearing, in marched two young boys (brothers).
My heart broke for their mother who cried while listening to the bad things her
sons had done.
This theme continued throughout the week. I observed a trial where a mother
lost rights to her three-year old son. I was the representative . . . during case
discussions for children on the mental health docket. I completed case intakes
for two boys involved in the criminal justice system, but also have learning
disabilities that have impeded their ability to complete school. After each of
these experiences, I had to wonder if the disrepair of the courthouse had become
of [sic] reflection of the desolation. 210
This week one of the tasks I was asked to assist with was listening to multiple
discs of jail calls and take notes of anytime the defendant (or the person he
called) discussed his case. . . . At first listening to the calls was no big deal;
however, as the calls progressed to later dates and more time elapsed since he
had been incarcerated, the more stressed he sounded. What really got me though
was after one of his court dates, he was talking to various people on the phone
as to whether or not he should take the plea deal he was offered which would
result in a minimum of 10 years of time versus rolling the dice with multiple . . .
charges and a habitual offender. During one of the calls he started to cry and
breakdown that if he took the plea he wouldn’t be out until after his son (approx.
7 years old) graduated high school. He genuinely sounded devastated at the
thought of this and it really broke my heart to hear, especially knowing that little
boy would be going the rest of his life without his dad around and that the mother
would be having to deal with all the repercussions of that. It really caused me to
reflect on that criminals are still human beings, granted some of them are pretty
messed up human beings with a whole host of issues that cause them to engage
in the behaviors that they do but they are still people with emotions and feelings.
It has to be hard to be a prosecutor and finding inner peace and a balance between
seeking justice and being able to make tough decisions in doing their job. This
guy was a “bad guy” with a really nasty history but at his core, he is still a dad
to a little boy who was missing his dad, not understanding why he couldn’t see
him or when he was coming home. Two days later that defendant came into
court and had decided to take the plea deal. As I sat and watched the proceeding,
I couldn’t help but feel a little sad for his family. Meeting the victim afterward
was just as depressing when I heard that she had been turning to pills to cope
with the mental anguish she had suffered for the last year and a half as a result

210. Student Journal Entry, Externship Course, University of Detroit Mercy School of Law
(Summer 2018) (on file with author).
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of [the crime] . . . and that her pill use prevents her from being the mother she
wants to be to her little girl. 211

These confrontations with suffering can be painful, even wounding, but they
deepen students’ appreciation of the complexities and tragedies routinely
encountered in legal practice. Both students and lawyers can grow callous, but
with good guidance, the experiences can also result in greater humility,
compassion, and commitment, not to mention a deeper understanding of the
operation of law.
Some form of these encounters should be part of the first-year curriculum.
For example, at least one of the required first-year courses each semester could
incorporate some form of course-related service learning and guided reflection
on the service learning experience. Service learning would attach human faces
to the doctrines students learn in class: reading about unconscionability is one
thing; doing an intake for an elderly, illiterate man on a fixed income who was
targeted for a small loan at 300% interest gives the doctrine a fuller meaning.
Students may overlook a crucified person in a case book; that’s just part of the
“facts” section of their brief for class. Students rarely will overlook a crucified
person directly in their path. In short, service learning allows students to see
those who are suffering. Placing these experiences within required courses, with
faculty working side-by-side with students, models for students the virtue and
care we wish to cultivate in them and ourselves. And such experiences take
students outside themselves and thus may serve as a powerful corrective for the
pathologies of the first year: the obsession with grades and status relative to
peers, as well as the attendant anxiety and depression students too often suffer.
Other experiences during the first year also may cultivate students’
mercifulness. Field trips to court, especially criminal court, are always powerful.
Guest speakers—lawyers and judges, to be sure, but also parties to civil and
criminal litigation—show students that legal disputes are human disputes
involving real people worthy of their attention and compassion. And of course
there are opportunities for one-day clinics—for example, our institution has oneday driver’s license restoration clinics—and service days. All of these
experiences nicely augment curricular service learning opportunities.
Opportunities for reflection should accompany service learning and related
experiences. (Reflection should play a greater role in the law school curriculum
more generally.) Among other things, guided reflection gives students tools for
coping constructively with the emotional demands of direct encounters with
suffering, need, and injustice, and allows students to see connections between
their past experiences and who they are becoming professionally. Reflection is
both cognitive and affective, and some focus on students’ affective experiences
may not only help develop students’ capacity for both compassion and self211. Student Journal Entry, Externship Course, University of Detroit Mercy School of Law
(Winter 2018) (on file with author).
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knowledge, but may also help students integrate their own emotional and moral
compasses into their professional identities. One hopes this greater integration
would, in turn, reduce the prevalence of substance abuse, anxiety, and
depression among law students and within the world of practice.
There are two major objections to incorporating service learning into the
first-year curriculum. The first is practical: there isn’t enough time given all the
material students must learn. The second echoes Professor Breen’s concern
about learning about justice merely by taking clinics: service learning may risk
developing students with warm hearts but empty heads, with no real
understanding of what justice requires in any particular situation.
I am sympathetic to the concern about time, but this concern always exists.
Professors who teach courses in the first-year curriculum constantly must choose
between breadth versus depth of coverage, and this is another version of that
choice. If we want mercifulness to be part of students’ professional identity
formation, then such formation should begin during the first year, which most
would say is the most transformative portion of students’ formal legal education.
Especially during the first year, students absorb our values and priorities, and
relegating formation in mercifulness to upper level clinics represents a lost
opportunity: too little, too late.
I am less sympathetic to the concern about warm hearts and empty heads.
Frankly, the greater risk during law school is that we form lawyers with clever
heads and cold hearts, or lawyers whose heads and hearts are alienated, operating
on parallel tracks. Incorporating affectively-loaded experiences during the first
year is a move in the right direction. Moreover, the incorporation of service
learning into required courses addresses Professor Breen’s concerns: students’
service to others takes place within the context of in-depth examination of
doctrine and of the justice of such doctrines. In fact, direct encounters with
persons with legal difficulties spur deep thought about the operation of legal
doctrines, in a way that too rarely happens when students learn doctrines as part
of regular classroom instruction.
A commitment to mercifulness suggests other tweaks to the first-year
curriculum. For example, criminal law professors may consider augmenting the
standard discussion of retribution and deterrence with consideration of forms of
restorative justice such as those practiced within some Native American
communities. It also suggests alterations to the upper level curriculum, most
notably a greater focus on alternative dispute resolution.
2.

A Greater Focus on Alternative Dispute Resolution

A second way to fulfill the Mercy commitment to mercifulness is through
an increased focus on alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”), especially
mediation.
The assumption that litigation within an adversarial system is lawyers’
principal method for addressing clients’ problems is built into the very structure
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of legal education. Students begin law school by learning to read cases—stories
of disputes that were resolved only through litigation.
Of course, students learn soon enough that few cases go to trial, for reasons
both healthy and problematic. In clinics, externships, and summer work
experiences, they see how often cooperation and civility between lawyers is the
norm, and they also see how often cases settle. They learn the costs—financial
and emotional—that parties bear during scorched earth litigation.
A commitment to mercifulness does not necessarily require a focus on
mediation, as litigation itself is sometimes necessary to restore a party to dignity,
but such a focus is consistent with an orientation toward mercy. Restoration to
dignity includes, when possible, reconciliation of relationships and mending of
broken communities. This can happen through litigation, but mediation is a
natural fit. An extensive discussion of this is beyond the scope of this article, but
some upper-level experiences in ADR, whether through training in ADR skills
or through consideration of issues in doctrinal classes through an ADR lens,
would further students’ formation as merciful lawyers. It is also consistent with
a commitment to nonviolence, which is one of the Critical Concerns.
3.

Concrete Work on the Critical Concerns

Finally, a commitment to mercifulness should include academic focus and
community work on the Mercy Institute’s Critical Concerns. Each concern seeks
to address an area in which the recognition and restoration of human dignity is
a matter of special urgency. The Sisters of Mercy have discerned that these
concerns should shape their thought and social action. A School of Law under
Mercy sponsorship needn’t reinvent the wheel, as each subject presents rich
opportunity for study and action. A distribution requirement would allow
students to choose the concern of special interest and urgency to them (say,
immigration law) and learn more deeply about the legal issues in that area.
But clinics and other courses aren’t enough. For example, a course on
Critical Race Theory cannot substitute for a larger institutional commitment to
racial equity. This is true of gender as well, as the next section will discuss.
B.

The Commitment to Women and Girls

A special commitment to the wellbeing of women, girls, and other
vulnerable groups is a sine qua non for legal education in the Mercy tradition. 212
Moreover, this commitment is wide ranging and begins with curriculum.

212. Notably, my research has not revealed any American law school whose Mission Statement
or other statements of central commitments included a special commitment to the wellbeing of
women and girls. A commitment to women and girls should not preclude a strong commitment to
other groups that are as vulnerable as, or more vulnerable than, American women and girls (at least
as a large and undifferentiated group). However, given the history and priorities of the Sisters of
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Curriculum

First, the curriculum should reflect this commitment to women and girls. Of
course, the curriculum should include courses like Feminist Legal Theory,
Women and the Law, and so forth. More importantly, though, if faculty members
share a deep commitment to women and girls, then traditional women’s concerns
likely will be visible in standard doctrinal courses. Is domestic violence, one of
the society’s most common crimes, taught in the Criminal Law course? Is rape,
and if so, how? 213 Prostitution and sex work? Do courses in human rights include
coverage of issues principally affecting women, such as female genital
mutilation, human trafficking, etc.? And so forth. 214
However, focusing on discrete issues disproportionately affecting women
and girls is not enough. Rather, students also should be exposed to critiques of
and challenges to the lens through which American culture, political institutions,
and laws view such issues. As Robin West and others have recognized, the rules
of the American legal system have failed to adequately protect women in large
part because of the system’s conception of the person:
The “connected individual” [connected as a caregiver, in an intimate relationship
with a spouse, etc.] . . . is simply not the subject of modern political and legal
thought any more than she is the subject of political and legal protection . . . .
[M]ainstream liberal theory, as well as the liberal legalism which is its outgrowth
in the legal academy, is premised upon an individual who prides himself on his
autonomy and on his self-chosen life projects . . . . It is that profoundly

Mercy, any Mercy institution, including a Mercy law school, should have an easily recognizable
commitment to women and girls.
Many law schools, whether religiously affiliated or not, express commitments to specific groups or
causes. For example, the Mission Statement of Howard University School of Law focuses (albeit
not exclusively) on the rights of African-Americans and other minority groups:
Consistent with providing the professional leadership necessary to advocate and defend the
rights of all, but particularly of African-Americans and other minorities, it is the Law
School’s mission to . . . [e]ngage as an institution in the active pursuit of solutions to
domestic and international legal, social, economic and political problems that are of
particular concern to minority groups.
Our Mission, HOW. UNIV. SCH. OF L., http://law.howard.edu/content/our-mission [https://perma.
cc/3M82-EAXW] (last accessed Nov. 10, 2018) (emphasis added). A law school in the Mercy
tradition might have a similar express commitment to women’s rights.
213. All too often Criminal Law professors decline to teach the law of rape, largely out of
discomfort with the subject matter and with the ambiguity of the law itself. See Jennifer M.
Denbow, The Pedagogy of Rape Law: Objectivity, Identity and Emotion, 64 J. LEGAL EDUC. 16,
16–17 (2014) (discussing professors’ omission of rape law and the reasons for that omission).
214. None of this is to suggest a limitation on faculty academic freedom. There can be
principled reasons not to cover certain topics. However, all too often, the omission of topics from
standard case books is a result of the invisibility or unfamiliarity of those topics to the drafters of
the books, or perhaps an unexamined assumption that the topics simply aren’t legally interesting or
important. This article simply suggests that professors consider critically, and in the light of gender
equity, their default settings about what should and shouldn’t be covered.
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disconnected individual which liberal societies, liberal politics, and liberal
ideologies, including legal ones, are designed to protect. 215

Differently put, although a greater emphasis on, say, domestic violence may be
somewhat useful, the law’s inadequate treatment of this issue will not simply
change through more attention. Rather, for true reform to occur, American law’s
conception of the human person must broaden and abandon its radical
individualism.
Many schools of thought—such as communitarianism—challenge the
radically individualistic rights-oriented assumptions of American legal thought
and doctrine. A Mercy-affiliated law school that is characterized by a special
commitment to women and girls might (or should) consistently use the tools and
insights of feminism/womanism/mujerista to critique and, at times, advocate for
the reform of, American legal doctrine.
Of course, there are many schools of feminist and womanist thought. 216 The
insights of relational feminism, 217 especially when combined with some of the
insights of both radical and intersectional feminism, provide some of the most
incisive feminist critiques of American law.
Relational feminism became prominent in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s
within the fields of psychology and moral philosophy. 218 Lawrence Kohlberg’s
studies of moral decision-making had implied that girls’ moral decision making
was less developed than that of boys. 219 Psychologist Carol Gilligan studied
Kohlberg’s data, girls’ and boys’ explanations for their moral reasoning, etc.,
and ultimately concluded that many girls operate from a moral paradigm that
Kohlberg simply had not recognized: an ethic of care, that is, a perspective that
assumed as a starting point the connectedness of persons and the primacy of care
for others as a moral value. 220 For Gilligan, this “ethic of care” represented a
moral perspective that competed with, or was at least distinct from, the “ethic of
justice” that served as Kohlberg’s norm for moral thought. 221 Although men can
215. WEST, supra note 55, at 4.
216. Just as obviously, some such schools of thought stand in direct contrast—even active
opposition—to Catholic or even more broadly Christian precepts. This shouldn’t matter at a
university, especially given the emphasis within the Catholic intellectual tradition of engaging all
voices and perspectives in the search for truth and the quest for justice.
217. This is also sometimes called cultural feminism. Catherine Albiston et al., Feminism in
Relation, 17 WIS. WOMEN’S L. J. 1, 3 n.8 (2002).
218. See, e.g., CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND
WOMEN’S DEVELOPMENT 1–2 (1982) (arguing that women’s emotional and moral development
have been ignored in psychological and other research).
219. Id. at 18 (“Prominent among those who thus appear to be deficient in moral development
when measured by Kohlberg’s scale are women, whose judgments seem to exemplify the third
stage of his six-stage sequence. At this stage morality is conceived in interpersonal terms and
goodness is equated with helping and pleasing others.”).
220. Id. at 173.
221. Id. at 173–74.
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operate from an ethic of care and women from an ethic of justice, and people
may operate from either at various times, Gilligan and other relational feminists
posited that generally women are more likely than men to operate from this ethic
of care. 222
Within the legal academy, Georgetown professor Robin West is probably
the most prominent voice for applying the insights of relational feminism to
American law. 223 Her starting point is a conception of people not as wholly and
radically autonomous individuals but as “connected selves:”
We know . . . that . . . connections to others and to our social worlds are
important, and even central, to our identity. . . . Connections to others give us
pleasure, they give our lives content, direction, and structure, and more than any
other experience we share, they inform and constitute our “moral sense.” 224

These connections are not invariably positive and can, in fact, be the source of
some of our greatest harms: rape (including marital rape), domestic violence,
and child abuse. 225 Some threats and harms to our connections are natural—
physical illness, death—but, as Professor West and others recognize, many are
culturally specific consequences of political and legal forces. 226 As described
above, one great source of threat and harm is American law’s radically
individualistic view of the human person, which, in the view of West and others,
is “all a function of our sorry history of sexist exclusion: we have excluded
women’s . . . interests and voices from our political and legal history, and thus
have unsurprisingly failed to protect women from the harms they
disproportionately suffer within damaging relations of connection.” 227
Beyond her positions that the “connected individual” is essentially invisible
within American law and that women, more than men, suffer from this
invisibility, West’s feminist analysis of American law rests on two assumptions:
first, that the “ethic of care” is a “principled moral stance, rather than an affective
emotional response, and therefore [is] . . . of importance in all areas of life
[including the political and legal spheres], and not just the familial;” 228 and
222. Cf. id. at 173 (“Yet in the different voice of women lies the truth of an ethic of care, the
tie between relationship and responsibility, and the origins of aggression in the failure of
connection.”).
223. In a review of Caring for Justice, Michael Cahill described the book as a “provocative
foray into new territory.” See Michael T. Cahill, Book Review, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1884, 1884 (1998).
224. WEST, supra note 55, at 1.
225. Id. at 2 (“Obviously, while some of the ‘connections’ that tie us to others are life-affirming,
others are invasive and overpowering. They diminish rather than enlarge the individuals who
participate in them.”).
226. Id. at 3.
227. Id. at 7.
228. Id. at 6 (emphasis added); see also id. at 9 (“[I]f it is true . . . that the act of caring for
others to whom we are connected in some way is central to our moral lives, then our capacity for
care should be at the center of our understanding of our public and legal, as well as private and
personal, virtues, and specifically that it should be central to the meaning of legal justice.”).
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second, that women’s subordination within American culture is the principal
cause of the invisibility of the connected self and of the public irrelevance of an
ethic of care. 229 The invisibility of the “connected individual” and the exclusion
of a moral “ethic of care” from public discussions has not merely harmed
women. Rather, West proposes, the harm is also “to our law, our understanding
of the nature of harm and sense of justice.” 230
Proceeding from these assumptions, West’s thesis is jurisprudential: “Our
justice is not just when it is not caring, and care is not caring when it is not
just.” 231 The first chapter of Caring for Justice is devoted to exploring and
defending this claim. 232 (Professor West’s thesis calls to mind Dr. Margaret
Farley’s argument that mercy both requires justice and makes justice
possible. 233)
A law school in the Mercy tradition may not accept relational feminism’s 234
critique of American law, but, at the very least, it should engage feminist
perspectives on law and on justice.
Furthermore, though not necessarily religious, the relational feminist
perspective is at least a first cousin to much of Catholic social teaching and to
the perspectives of Catholic social teaching on the human person. Often women
are justifiably nervous when clerical types begin talking about gender—I sure as
hell am!—but the insights of relational feminism are consistent with the starting
point of Catholic social teaching: the common good. 235 Discussion of the

229. WEST, supra note 55, at 8.
230. Id. (emphasis in original).
231. Id. at 9.
232. See id. at 9, 22–93.
233. See supra Part VI.A.
234. Critics of relational feminism argue—correctly, I believe—that it is an essentialist
position. In her Introduction to Caring for Justice, West addresses critics of the essentialist position,
including those from the liberal and post-modernist schools of feminism. See WEST, supra note 55,
at 12–13. Professor West is most persuaded by intersectional feminists, but argues that the problem
highlighted by intersectionalists is white racism, not essentialism. Id. at 15. Differently put, “it
doesn’t follow from the differentiating experiences and interests of black women or lesbian women
from white women or heterosexual women, that all women don’t share some interests or
experiences.” Id. As to the liberal feminist critique of essentialism, West agrees with Carol Gilligan
that the “burden of proof” should rest with those asserting the “no difference” position. Id. at 18–
19.
235. The common good is a rich term within Catholic social teaching, and although it uses
somewhat different language, it takes the “connected individual”—not the radically autonomous
and separate self—as a given: “The human person cannot find fulfillment in himself, that is, apart
from the fact that he exists ‘with’ others and ‘for’ others.” Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace,
Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Catholic Church (2004) (available at www.vatican.
va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/justpeace/documents/rc_pc_justpeace_doc_20060526_com
pendio-dott-soc_en.html) (last visited Aug. 20, 2018). Gaudium et Spes, a seminal document of the
Second Vatican Council, defines the common good as “the sum of those conditions of social life
which allow social groups and their individual members relatively thorough and ready access to

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2019]

LAW SCHOOL IN A DIFFERENT VOICE

441

common good within Catholic social teaching reveals a focus on the “connected
individual,” not the radically autonomous individual of American law. 236
Furthermore, the clear position of Catholic social teaching is that all persons—
both women and men—are responsible for the health of public life, that is, for
working to achieve the common good. Moreover, Pope John Paul II’s Mulieris
Dignitatem 237 implies that women’s voices in law and government are necessary
to achieve a balanced, healthy society.
Several possibilities exist for the incorporation of feminist critiques of
American law. One is simply to incorporate such perspectives within the
standard law school curriculum; indeed, this should happen. Another—with a
nod to Professor Breen—is to include the materials in a jurisprudence course.
Another might be through a distribution requirement that could include any
number of courses (Jurisprudence, Feminist Legal Theory, even an externship).
Yet another might be more organic: have some sessions for interested faculty
members and let things develop as they will.
2.

Institutional Culture

A Mercy law school’s curriculum and scholarship should reflect a serious
commitment to the wellbeing of women and to the inclusion of their
perspectives. However, the institution’s commitment to women’s wellbeing
should not merely be intellectual. Our students may hear what we say, but they
believe, absorb, and appropriate what we do. Therefore, the school’s institutional
culture should genuinely value women, take affirmative steps to ensure gender
equity, and question and ultimately dismantle institutional structures that
disadvantage women. But how?
their own fulfillment.” Pope Paul VI, Gaudium et Spes § 26 (1965) (available at www.vatican.
va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_const_19651207_gaudium-et-spes_
en.html) (last visited Aug. 20, 2018). Every member of society bears responsibility for the common
good: “[T]he obligations of justice and love are fulfilled only if each person, contributing to the
common good, according to his own abilities and the needs of others, also promotes and assists the
public and private institutions dedicated to bettering the conditions of human life.” Id. at § 30. The
Bishops’ Conference of England and Wales notes this is not simple utilitarianism: “Because we are
interdependent, the common good is more like a multiplication sum, where is any one number is
zero then the total is always zero. . . . The common good is about how to live well together. It is the
whole network of social conditions which enable human individuals and groups to flourish and live
a full, genuinely human life. At the heart of the common good, solidarity acknowledges that all are
responsible for all, not only as individuals but collectively at every level.” Bishops’ Conference of
England and Wales, Choosing the Common Good, http://www.cbcew.org.uk/download/34851/25
8839/file/choosing-the-common-good-2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/YN7W-7978] (last visited Oct.
16, 2017).
236. See supra note 235.
237. Pope John Paul II, Mulieris Dignitatem (1988) (available at https://w2.vatican.va/content/
john-paul-ii/en/apost_letters/1988/documents/hf_jp-ii_apl_19880815_mulieris-dignitatem.html
[https://perma.cc/A4M2-EBYH]) (last visited Aug. 20, 2018) (describing men and women as
sharing a common responsibility for the destiny of humanity).
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Robin West’s insights about the radical individualism of American law also
apply to the cultures of American law schools. Just as American law “is
premised upon an individual who prides himself on his autonomy and on his
self-chosen life projects,” 238 so too are American law schools. And just as
American law protects and values the radically autonomous individual self, not
the connected self it hardly recognizes, American law schools principally value
the radically autonomous individual self over the connected self. And all too
often this means law schools overvalue the contributions of a select few radically
autonomous, mostly male faculty members over other, often female faculty
members who operate more as “connected selves”—connected to students and
to the institution itself.
A Mercy institution should privilege its identity as a community, rejecting
the highly individualistic “star system” 239 prevalent in American academia. This
focus on law school as an intellectual and professional community is consistent
with the promotion of women’s wellbeing, with Catholic social teaching’s
commitment to the common good, and with the Mercy Institute’s identification
of community as one of its core values. But what does it mean to value
community and to reject the star system, and why is this consistent with
institutional justice toward women?
The star system influences all of legal academia, even modestly ranked law
schools, and even in a post-crash era. Of course, all schools seek eminent
scholars: such persons may benefit the institution in a variety of ways, most
notably by increasing the reputation of a department. Schools should seek such
persons, and, at times and to a limited extent, higher pay, course releases, and
similar benefits may be appropriate means for recognizing high achievement and
for allowing an especially talented scholar to focus on an important project.
However, this recognition of excellence is distinct from what is meant by
the star system. The star system is characterized by “vast inequities in salary,
other perks, and teaching loads,” 240 with “stars” who all too often see themselves
as “individual entrepreneur[s] rather than member[s] of a community.” 241
An extreme version of the star system may be problematic at any institution.
Some critics assert that although “stars” may serve as marketing tools for their
institutions, they often teach relatively few students, so any actual direct

238. WEST, supra note 55, at 4.
239. Cf., e.g., George Packer, Daily Comment: America’s Star System, THE NEW YORKER (July
22, 2013) (available at https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/americas-star-system
[https://perma.cc/Y8Z6-RX8L]) (last visited Aug. 20, 2018) (noting that “the star system, with
wildly unequal rewards for relatively small differences in talent, holds sway in virtually every area
of American society”).
240. Heather Dubrow, The Counteroffer Game, Inside Higher Ed (Aug. 26, 2013),
https://www.insidehighered.com/advice/2013/08/26/essay-calling-end-counteroffer-strategies-aca
demic-hiring [https://perma.cc/4ZCM-MMZH] (last visited on Feb. 1, 2018).
241. Id.
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educational benefit may be illusory or at least overstated. 242 In short, although
stars may “bring visibility and luster[,] they also bring special deals, special—
in the sense of privileged—rules of conduct, and discord, and jealousy.” 243 At
its worst, the star system “is destructive of faculty morale and of the kind of
community in which the satisfactory functioning of a college . . . depends.” 244
However, beyond all of these criticisms, which could apply at any law
school, the star system in its present form is fundamentally incompatible with
the Mercy commitment to the wellbeing of women. 245 There are several reasons
for this.
First, as an empirical matter, very few female faculty members, and even
fewer who are also people of color, are identified as stars and receive the
extraordinary privileges that accompany the star system. Take one example from
Canada: In 2010, the Canadian government allowed several public universities
to hire nineteen “academic stars,” none of whom were women; indeed, not even
one of the thirty-six nominees on the shortlist were women. 246 The issue in the
United States—and in American law schools—doesn’t appear to be very
different.
This gender difference in “stars” seems likely to be, at least in part, a product
of structural discrimination: some combination of implicit bias and old boy-ism.
Professor Richard Delgado’s words, spoken in a slightly different context more
than thirty years ago, still ring true:
It does not matter where one enters this universe; one comes to the same result:
an inner circle of about a dozen white, male writers who comment on, take polite

242. See Christopher Shea, Academic Inequality and the Star System, THE CHRONICLE OF
HIGHER EDUC. (Apr. 14, 2014), https://www.chronicle.com/article/Academic-Inequalitythe/14
5843 [https://perma.cc/W9CQ-S4YN]) (last accessed Nov. 23, 2018).
243. HENRY ROSOVSKY WITH INGE-LISE AMEER, A NEGLECTED TOPIC: PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT OF COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY TEACHERS, IN UNIVERSITIES AND THEIR LEADERSHIP
119, 124 (William G. Bowen & Harold T. Shapiro, eds., 2016).
244. RUDOLPH H. WEINGARTNER, THE MORAL DIMENSIONS OF ACADEMIC ADMINISTRATION
106 (1999) (available at https://books.google.com/books?isbn=0847690970 [https://perma.cc/9C
YF-S8UV]) (last accessed Nov. 23, 2018).
245. It is also inconsistent with Antiracism, one of the Critical Concerns of the Sisters of Mercy
of the Americas. See supra Part III.
246. Patricia Rae, Mark Jones, et al., Failed by the “Star” System, BULLETIN, https://bfixedulle
tin-archives.caut.ca/bulletin/articles/2010/06/failed-by-the-star-system (last accessed Nov. 23,
2018); see also Sandra Jones, The “Star” Academics are so often White and Male, THE GUARDIAN
(Apr. 22, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/education/2013/apr/22/university-jobs-not-being
-advertised [https://perma.cc/KT44-YVUS] (describing similar system in Great Britain) (last
accessed Nov. 23, 2018).
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issue with, extol, criticize, and expand on each other’s ideas. It is something like
an elaborate minuet. 247

The research of Virginia Valian and others 248 shows how implicit bias results in
the underrating of the intellectual contributions of women and the considerably
lower odds that a woman will be identified as a rising or actual star. One see
signs of this throughout academia: a study of student evaluations shows that men
are referred to as “smart” and women as “helpful.” 249 These biases are most
influential when criteria for evaluation of work product are inherently
unclear 250—certainly the case in legal scholarship. In short, the star system
harms women in part because, whatever the merits of their work, women are less
likely to be identified and receive the benefits of the system.
Second, sexual harassment appears to be more prevalent in workplaces
characterized by a star system, and sexual harassment obviously is inconsistent
with a serious commitment to women’s wellbeing. One reason that Bill
O’Reilly, Matt Lauer, and other prominent media figures were allowed to get
away with sexual harassment for years (with multiple targets and victims) is

247. Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights
Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 561, 563 (1984) (describing the absence of voices of color within
legal scholarship about civil rights).
248. VIRGINIA VALIAN, WHY SO SLOW? THE ADVANCEMENT OF WOMEN (MIT Press 1999)
(describing and synthesizing research on the barriers to women’s professional achievement and
advancement).
249. See Benjamin Schmidt, Gender Bias Exists in Professor Evaluations, NEW YORK TIMES
(Dec. 16, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2015/12/16/is-it-fair-to-rate-professorsonline/gender-bias-exists-in-professor-evaluations [https://perma.cc/GK7B-AJT5]) (last accessed
Nov. 23, 2018) (describing a study of words used in Rate My Professor, in which men were forty
percent more likely to be described as smart, seventy percent more likely to be described as brilliant,
and 130% more likely to be described as a genius). For a fascinating look at the data, see Gendered
Language in Teacher Reviews, http://benschmidt.org/profGender/#%7B%22database%22%3A%
22RMP%22%2C%22plotType%22%3A%22pointchart%22%2C%22method%22%3A%22return
_json%22%2C%22search_limits%22%3A%7B%22word%22%3A%5B%22mean%22%5D%2C
%22department__id%22%3A%7B%22%24lte%22%3A25%7D%7D%2C%22aesthetic%22%3A
%7B%22x%22%3A%22WordsPerMillion%22%2C%22y%22%3A%22department%22%2C%22
color%22%3A%22gender%22%7D%2C%22counttype%22%3A%5B%22WordsPerMillion%22
%5D%2C%22groups%22%3A%5B%22department%22%2C%22gender%22%5D%2C%22testG
roup%22%3A%22D%22%7D [https://perma.cc/N98X-5E8U] (last accessed Aug. 20, 2018).
Interestingly, the male advantage in teaching evaluations exists even for identical online courses in
which the only difference is students’ belief about the instructor’s gender. See, e.g., Kristina M.W.
Mitchell & Jonathan Martin, Gender Bias in Student Evaluations, 51-3 POLITICAL SCIENCE &
POLITICS 648 (July 2018) (available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/ps-politicalscience-and-politics/article/gender-bias-in-student-evaluations/1224BE475C0AE75A2C2D85532
10C4E27/core-reader) (last accessed Nov. 23, 2018).
250. Virtually all of the research on implicit bias suggests its influence is strongest in the
presence of unclear or ambiguous criteria.
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precisely star culture. 251 Academia is not immune to this dynamic, as scandals
at the University of California-Berkeley 252 and elsewhere show.
But the star system is not antithetical to a Mercy law school’s commitment
to women merely because of the paucity of female stars and a potentially
increased risk of sexual harassment. Even if there were an equal gender
distribution of perceived stars and even absent an increased risk of sexual
harassment, the star system, at least in its exaggerated form, has no place at a
Mercy institution.
The third reason a Mercy institution must reject the star system is, in fact,
the most important. The central assumption of the star system is a radical
individualism: as four Canadian professors have said, the “essence of the star
system is to romanticize individual performers while (and by) underplaying the
contributing role of their teams, institutions, and other support networks.” 253 But
this radical individualism runs counter not only to relational and most other
schools of feminism by undervaluing the “connected self,” but also to the
Christian view of the person. A Mercy institution’s Christian identity need not
mean every student and employee accepts, say, the divinity of Jesus, but such an
institution should operate out of a roughly Christian anthropology in which
faculty members exist in community with one another, the administration, and
students. A narcissism-infused celebrity culture—with an intellectual patina, no
doubt, but devaluing an ethic of care—betrays Catherine McAuley’s vision,
which privileges community building over lone wolfing and self-bestowal over
self-aggrandizement.
This statement of the value of community does not explain how to achieve
such a community. Hiring for mission plays a role. Institutional incentives and
standards play a role. Decanal modeling and commitment play a role.
Importantly, though, privileging community over individual stardom will
not, by itself, ensure the wellbeing of women, people of color, and other
vulnerable members of the institution. A law school committed to the wellbeing
of women and girls will engage in continuous study and self-examination about
its own policies and practices with regard to administrators, faculty, and

251. Jena McGregor, How Too Much Focus on “Superstar” Workers Enables Harassment,
WASHINGTON POST (Dec. 17, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/on-leadership/wp/
2017/12/19/the-metoo-movement-is-a-warning-sign-about-the-star-system-at-many-companies
/?utm_term=.dd22c2ff2e82 [https://perma.cc/39HK-YU5Y] (last accessed Nov. 23, 2018).
252. See, e.g., Colleen Flaherty, Another Berkeley Star Accused, INSIDER HIGHER ED (March
24, 2017), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2017/03/24/berkeley-again-accused-protectingreputation-star-professor-instead-acting-reports [https://perma.cc/4C9U-MY84] (last accessed
Nov. 23, 2018).
253. Patricia Rae, Mark Jones, Annette Burfoot, & Frank Burke, Failed by the “Star” System,
WORD PRESS, https://qufa.wordpress.com/2010/06/22/caut-bulletin-failed-by-the-’star’-system/
[https://perma.cc/M339-SEVN] (June 22, 2010) (last accessed Nov. 23, 2018).
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students. 254 It is simply not enough to hire both women and men as
administrators and faculty, or to admit female and male students to the school,
and then assume everyone will rise or fall on their own merit. (Note the whole
“rise and fall” notion is itself deeply individualistic.)
Such an assumption is belied by a considerable body of psychological,
sociological, and organizational research. The more accurate assumption is that
unless an institution takes affirmative steps, our defaults will disadvantage
women and persons of color in important ways. This is true in part because most
of us—whether male, female, or differently gendered—operate from preexisting
schemas regarding male and female traits and roles. Without structures to correct
for this bias, most of us will fall into patterns that hamper the professional
development and minimize the professional contributions of women, especially
women of color. Take just a few examples:
a) Service work: Cassandra Guarino and Victor Borden—among others—
have documented relatively large discrepancies in the amount of time
female and male academics devote to service responsibilities. 255
Notably, women engage in considerably more internal institutional
service work—recruitment of students and other significant committee
work—than do men. 256 Although this service work is essential to the
successful operation of an academic institution—it is what one might
consider “connected self” work—the available research (not to mention
what everyone kind of knows) indicates service work doesn’t matter
much in tenure or promotion. 257
b) Systematic Undervaluing of the Intelligence and Intellectual Potential of
Female Faculty Members/Systematic Overvaluing of the Intelligence
and Intellectual Potential of Male Faculty Members: Basic research on
implicit bias strongly suggests that men in the legal academy will be
identified as smart and promising in a way that is far less likely for
women. 258 And, in fact, the available research suggests this is exactly the
case as regards a variety of metrics that play a major role in determining

254. This should be true of race as well.
255. Cassandra Guarino, Why Higher Education Needs to Get Rid of the Gender Gap for
Academic Housekeeping, THE CONVERSATION, http://theconversation.com/why-higher-ed-needsto-get-rid-of-the-gender-gap-for-academic-housekeeping-82135 [https://perma.cc/BGC4-ZY4K]
(Sept. 27, 2017) (summarizing a study reported in the journal Research in Higher Education) (last
accessed Nov. 23, 2018).
256. I do not know whether this is true at law schools, but I have no reason to believe law
schools are any different from other segments of academia.
257. Guarino, supra note 255.
258. See VALIAN, supra note 248, at 128 (describing, inter alia, studies of ratings of CVs and
of academic papers in which identical CVs and papers were rated more highly if the documents
were attributed to a male).
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the career trajectory of a legal academic. 259 A few examples will make
the point:
c) Article Selection and Citation Count: It is hardly news to anyone in legal
academia that the process for selecting law review articles for publication
is odd, even perverse. Indeed, law is virtually the only field in which
apprentices—students—serve as gatekeepers for intellectual discourse
within a discipline. 260 Research has already suggested that the selection
process strongly privileges professors at more elite schools, without
regard to the quality of work product: because student editors lack the
background to understand which articles might make a major
contribution, they use prestige—whether of a professor’s home
institution, of the law school the professor attended, or of the prestige of
those listed in the acknowledgements—as a proxy for the quality of the
piece. 261 Now add to that what we know about implicit gender and racial
bias, and one can see the problem. Research in a variety of fields has
long shown that academic CVs are rated more highly when associated
with a male name. 262 If this is true in the hard sciences, where criteria for
quality are presumably clearer than in a field like law, then one should
expect this to be even more true in law. And although the research is not
complete, that appears to be the case: in his article describing implicit
bias in article selection, Professor Higdon points to research by Professor
Minna Kotkin suggesting female scholars are underrepresented in the
“best” journals, 263 and there is other evidence of gender (and racial,
although there is less research on that point) discrimination in the article

259. If one prefers to avoid the language of careerism, as I myself do, one could instead say
that this limits a legal academic’s ability to make and enjoy the full use of her gifts and to have her
ideas achieve the influence they merit.
260. For a brief summary of criticisms of the selection process, see John P. Zimmer & Jason P.
Luther, Essay, Peer Review as an Aid to Article Selection in Student-Edited Legal Journals, 60 S.C.
L. REV. 959, 962-63 (2009). Notably, certain disciplines within law rely on peer review and other
processes respected and commonly used within other academic disciplines. For example, the
journals within legal research and writing—namely the Journal of the Association of Legal Writing
Directors, the Journal of the Legal Writing Institute, and the Journal of Legal Communication and
Rhetoric—all select articles through a process of peer review.
261. See, e.g., Michael J. Higdon, Beyond the Metatheoretical: Implicit Bias in Law Review
Article Selection, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 339, 341, 345 (2016) (describing the law review article
selection process as a “recipe for implicit bias”); Leah M. Christensen & Julie A. Oseid, Navigating
the Law Review Article Selection Process: An Empirical Study of Those with All the Power—
Student Editors, 59 S.C. L. REV. 175, 188 (2007) (describing, inter alia, the effect of certain
credentials on article selection, without regard to article quality).
262. Higdon, supra note 261, at 347-48.
263. Id. at 348 (quoting Minna J. Kotkin, Of Authorship and Audacity: An Empirical Study of
Gender Disparity and Privilege in the “Top Ten” Law Reviews, 31 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 385,
387 (2010)).
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selection process. 264 This matters for a variety of reasons. As Professor
Higdon points out, the current selection process “discourages
creativity[,] . . . undermines diversity of voice[,] . . . [and] marginalizes
practical skills scholarship.” 265 More to the point, for my purposes, this
state of affairs is bad for female faculty and administrators at law
schools, bad for female students, and, in fact, bad for women outside the
legal profession. The ways in which it is bad for female employees and
students are obvious. As for women outside the legal profession, it is bad
for them if one assumes that female law professors are more likely than
are men to write about issues disproportionately affecting women. If this
writing receives less attention, particularly in prominent journals, then
legal and social reform benefitting women is less likely.
d) Student Evaluations: As briefly described above, studies of student
evaluations further a picture of good male professors as “brilliant” or
“smart;” good female professors are “accessible” and “helpful.” 266 In
particular, the available social science research suggests that women’s
evaluations tend to be lower than men’s in large lecture-style classes,
probably because men are merely expected to be agentic whereas women
are also expected to be sensitive and nurturing. 267 In fact, most research
on teaching evaluations shows that evaluations are based primarily on
professors’ non-verbal behavior, rather than any material taught, and that
the connection with learning outcomes is questionable at best. 268
Furthermore, all too many students use anonymous teaching evaluations
as a “safe” forum to express their own conscious and unconscious racism
and sexism. 269 Yet despite the strong evidence that standard student
evaluations of teaching reflect gender and racial bias, especially in large
classes, and despite the weak evidence of any correlation between strong
teaching evaluations and student learning, these student evaluations are
264. Id. at 348-49.
265. Id. at 350-51.
266. See supra note 246 and accompanying text.
267. See, e.g., Lisa Martin, Student Evaluations of Teaching are Probably Biased. Does It
Matter?, WASH. POST (October 2, 2013) (available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
monkey-cage/wp/2013/10/02/student-evaluations-of-teaching-are-probably-biased-does-it-matter
/?utm_term=.9775b6adb939 [https://perma.cc/PX37-K5W8]) (last accessed Feb. 7, 2018).
268. See Deborah J. Merritt, Bias, the Brain, and Student Evaluations of Learning, 82 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 235, 274 (2008) (summarizing brain research that shows that most modern teaching
evaluation systems evaluate not student learning, but student response to professors’ nonverbal
behavior, and that “some of those [cognitive] distortions specifically burden white women, faculty
of color, and other traditionally disadvantaged groups”).
269. See, e.g., Meera E. Deo, A Better Tenure Battle: Fighting Bias in Teaching Evaluations,
31 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 7, 10 (2015) (describing study showing, inter alia, that “female law
faculty and particularly female faculty of color are routinely challenged by students in the
classroom and verbally attacked in (anonymous) course evaluations”).
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used in decision making regarding tenure and promotion and in
consideration for teaching awards and other awards for faculty
excellence. Moreover, they both reflect and shape perceptions of faculty
members’ intellectual abilities.
Given what we know about our biased defaults, a law school with a
commitment to women’s wellbeing should take steps to minimize such bias. A
Mercy law school should be on the cutting edge of these issues.
3.

Student Services

A Mercy law school’s special commitment to women, children, and the most
vulnerable in society should be apparent in various policies related to
admissions, financial aid, and student affairs.
As Brian Tamanaha and others have pointed out, 270 law schools’ scholarship
funds frequently are awarded to the most affluent students, who are more likely
to have received the kind of education and enrichment that translate into higher
LSAT scores and undergraduate grades. The practical result is that less affluent
and academically more vulnerable students in effect subsidize the educations of
wealthier, often academically better prepared students. 271
I do not harbor utopian fantasies of a dramatic change in this state of affairs,
particularly in an era of keen competition for strong students and at tuitiondependent institutions. However, fundraising for scholarships for a variety of
vulnerable students—women and men in the first generation of their families to
attend college or professional school, single parents, working parents, and so
forth—should be a clear priority for both mission-related and practical reasons.
Obviously such scholarships further the Mercy commitment to ensuring that
women, children, and other vulnerable populations acquire skills that will allow
them to be self-sufficient and to advocate for others. Moreover, such assistance
is likely to increase such students’ academic performance and professional
prospects by alleviating a major source of stress, namely how to pay for school.
Similarly, a Mercy law school might seek ways to alleviate the burden of
child care for its students. This could take a variety of different forms, ranging
from grants to subsidize child care to partnerships with nearby child care
providers that might provide a group discount to something involving an even
greater commitment, such as operating a day care center on site. Again, the
school’s location, funds, and other practical factors would dictate what such an
institution might be able to provide, but a commitment to family-friendly
policies and practices should be apparent at the institution.
Student Affairs policies and practices should reflect a similar commitment.
For example, some student affairs and career services programming might be
devoted to the concerns of non-traditional students. A career services office
270. BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS 97-98 (Univ. of Chicago Press 2012).
271. Id.
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might consider maintaining a clothing bank for those who lack money for
appropriate interview attire. This is not intended to be prescriptive. Rather, the
Mercy law school must discern the actual needs of its most vulnerable students,
including but not limited to women, and build programming around those needs.
A special commitment to women and girls and a focus on mercifulness are
the principal hallmarks of a law school in the Mercy tradition. However, a law
school in the Mercy tradition also should be characterized by an emphasis on
professional identity formation.
C. Professional Identity Formation
A concern for professional identity formation is not limited to law schools
in the Mercy tradition or, for that matter, to religiously affiliated law schools.
Rather, professional identity formation—the process by which students
appropriate for themselves the values of the legal profession at its best 272—is a
concern for all law schools. This has been clear since 2007, when the Carnegie
Report273 was published. The Carnegie Report identified three apprenticeships
that should comprise part of legal education: a cognitive apprenticeship
(“thinking like a lawyer”); a skills and practice apprenticeship (“acting like a
lawyer”); and, finally, a normative apprenticeship (professional identity and
values). 274
Since the publication of the Carnegie Report, a steadily increasing number
of scholars, especially those working in law school clinics, have explored
professional identity formation in legal education. 275 In fact, the lead author of
the Carnegie Report has argued that this focus on professional identity formation
is a “harbinger[] of a developing social movement in higher education.” 276
This social movement appears especially strong within some religiously
affiliated law schools. Within the past five years, three religiously affiliated law
schools—Regent, Mercer, and St. Thomas (Minnesota)—have held symposia on

272. This view of identity formation is consistent with Professor Kalscheur’s view of the
purpose of the Catholic intellectual tradition as the inculcation of virtues (habits of heart and mind).
Rev. Gregory Kalscheur, Key Task for Catholic Higher Ed, Inside Higher Ed (November 29, 2011),
https://www.insidehighered.com/views/2011/11/29/essay-future-direction-catholic-colleges
[https://perma.cc/3FCN-ZANK].
273. See William L. Sullivan et al., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE
PROFESSION OF LAW (2007). This report is more commonly known as “the Carnegie Report.”
274. Id.
275. See, e.g., Susan L. Brooks, Fostering Wholehearted Lawyers: Practical Guidance for
Supporting Law Students’ Professional Identity Formation, 14 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 412, 414-415
(2018); Christine Cerniglia Brown, Professional Identity Formation: Moving Backwards to Move
the Profession Forward, 61 LOY. L. REV. 313, 315 (2015).
276. William M. Sullivan, Professional Formation as Social Movement, 23 No. 1 PROF. LAW.
26, 27 (2015).
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professional identity formation. 277 Moreover, the University of St. Thomas
School of Law’s Holleran Center is devoted specifically to the question of
professional identity formation: its mission is to “provide innovative
interdisciplinary research, curriculum development and programs focusing
holistically on the formation of both students and practicing professionals into
ethical leaders in their communities.” 278
A full exploration of the question of professional identity formation is
beyond the scope of this article. I make only a few tentative points.
First, the obvious point that should go without saying: a Mercy law school
must take seriously the professional identity formation of its students. In fact,
just as Professor Kalscheur argued regarding Jesuit education, 279 the first
responsibility of a Mercy law school is formation.
Second, professional identity formation at a Mercy law school should
encompass more than one might typically imagine for lawyer professional
identity formation. Recall the commitment of a Mercy law school to
mercifulness, meaning, among other things, to an ethic of care and to the
restoration to dignity of those whose dignity has been denied. 280 These
commitments suggest that law students formed in this tradition should
appropriate for themselves identities as reconcilers (not merely competent and
ethical adversaries), healers, compassionate guides, and defenders of human
dignity. As Margaret Farley observed, mercy and justice can co-exist; in fact,
each requires the other. 281
Third, professional identity formation at a Mercy institution should
encourage students to understand any continuities or tensions between their
preexisting identities and their developing professional identities. Catherine
MacAuley’s decision to create a Mercy house didn’t emerge from thin air;
rather, the seeds for this vocation were planted early in life and were watered
regularly. 282
Similarly, as part of formation, students should be encouraged to understand
the ways in which their own wounds and vulnerabilities—their painful
identifications—have shaped and can inform and enrich their professional
277. Mercer University Law School, Ethics and Professionalism Symposia (November 11,
2018), https://law.mercer.edu/academics/centers/clep/symposia.cfm [https://perma.cc/X68V-N3
JC]; Regent University Law School, Regent University Law Review Symposium Presenters
(November 11, 2018), https://www.regent.edu/acad/schlaw/student_life/studentorgs/lawreview
/symposiumparticipants.cfm [https://perma.cc/4KRY-X22G]; University of St. Thomas School of
Law, Symposium/Workshop: The Next Steps of a Professional Formation Social Movement
(November 11, 2018), https://www.stthomas.edu/law [https://perma.cc/2JBJ-DPZQ].
278. University of St. Thomas School of Law, Holloran Center Mission, https://www.stthomas
.edu/hollorancenter/about/mission/ [https://perma.cc/AD3N-7MEP] (last accessed July 13, 2018).
279. See supra notes 179-81 and accompanying text.
280. See supra Part VI.A.
281. See supra Part VI.A.
282. See supra Part II.
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identities. Exploration and acknowledgment of wounds as part of professional
identity formation is derived directly from the life of Catherine MacAuley: her
deepest wound and her strong identification with the most vulnerable in
society—destitute women and children—combined with her gifts to create an
authentic and powerful vocation.
To be clear, I’m not proposing a law school model that encourages students
to hold hands, cry, and sing kumbaya. I know better and would hate it myself.
However, I also know of the anxiety, depression, and substance abuse endemic
within the legal profession, beginning with law students; 283 the legal culture that
extols strength and control while denying vulnerability and pain; and the
relationship between legal culture’s obsession with strength and the very real
anxiety, depression, and social isolation of individual lawyers. Unlike the
professions of social work, clinical psychology, and ministry, 284 the legal
profession has not yet fully acknowledged the generative potential of wounds,
pain, and vulnerability. Although it’s not clear what this would look like in the
context of professional identity formation within law schools, this is one
contribution a Mercy law school might make to the broader profession. We are
all wounded in some respects, and we all suffer. Even we lawyers can use our
own suffering to help others. Even lawyers can embody mercy.
CONCLUSION
The journey ends where it began, with questions of identity. Seeing us,
would Mary Scullion recognize us? Would Margaret Farley? Catherine
McAuley? If our commitment to women and girls is both clear and sophisticated,
and if we are people of mercy, then the education we provide will itself be a
work of mercy to our students and to the clients they later serve.
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